David Stanton (Cork East, Fine Gael)
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I move amendment No. 4:

In page 4, to delete lines 19 to 24 and substitute the following:“ (d) by the substitution of the following subsection for subsection (9):

“(9) In any proceedings it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is shown, that —

(a) a document purporting to be a summons is a summons duly applied for and issued, and

(b) the date specified in the summons as being the application date is the application date.”,

and(e) by the insertion of the following subsection after subsection (9) (inserted by paragraph (d)):

“(9A) In any proceedings it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is shown, that a summons to which subsection (2A) applies was created in an automatic manner on the basis of information transmitted as specified in paragraph (a) of that subsection.”.”.

This relates to certain presumptions provided for with regard to summonses, that is, a document purporting to be a summons, the application date specified in the summons and the summons being created on the basis of the information transmitted in the application for the summons. The Bill, as initiated, proposed that this matter be dealt with by way of an amendment to the existing section 1(9) of the Courts (No. 3) Act 1986. Amendment No. 4 proposes the insertion of a new subsection (9A) into section 1 of the Act of 1986 as an alternative to the originally proposed amendment to subsection (9). This alternative approach arises from further work from the Advisory Counsel and Parliamentary Counsel. The new subsection (9A) provides for presumption that the summons created under the new subsection (2A) is created on the basis of the information transmitted by the relevant court office. Also included in amendment No. 4, again on the advice of the Parliamentary Counsel, is an amended section 1(9) of the Act of 1986. This amended subsection (9) is essentially a restatement of the existing subsection, with the substitution of a presuming clause for a deeming clause. This reflects the preference on the part of Parliamentary Counsel for the drafting solution of a presuming clause rather than the deeming clause in the Act of 1986. However, the legislative effect is intended to be essentially the same.