Mr. Brian Cowen:

Well they would ... well, this is the point. First of all, let me say it is a valid thing to put on the table. I am not suggesting it's not. This is equally valid as what we ended up with in terms of its validity to be considered. One of the problems with nationalisation is, as I saw it, was you are taking it on straight away and you are taking it on for an unlimited time. You do that only if you had to do it, if you absolutely had to do it. Now on the basis of where were at, I didn't believe we had to nationalise Anglo Irish Bank that night. Now I didn't have a problem ideologically about that but I decided when it didn't have to be done because of other issues that came into play, like corporate governance issues, etc., then I didn't hesitate about nationalising a bank. That wasn't my issue. The question ... what Brian was I suppose... I'm very conscious of the fact that he's not here so I don't want to say anything other than that he obviously felt - and I've said it very clearly - his preference was for nationalisation. The problem with that is... That cuts both ways. Will it bring on more nationalisations? Will it be a confidence-building measure or not? Some would say it will, some would say it won't be. I mean, in the context of all the turmoil that was going on - and this was unprecedented stuff - my view was, at the end of the day, let's go with a temporary guarantee and if it ends up we have to nationalise this or any other bank, we'll do it but we'll only do it if we have to and there might be no harm, as we did with Pricewaterhouse, to go in there and get a better handle of what's going in, what way is-----