Mr. Tony Grimes:

I suppose that we would have been informed by a number of factors. One of them would have been the assurances from the regulator that there was not a solvency issue, but I think that we would probably also have taken, somewhat into account, some of the issues in the marketplace that were out there, and ... but, formally speaking, we had no indications that any of the banks were insolvent. They were meeting all of their regulatory requirements and so on. If you took a forward looking view I ... I contend that it still wasn't obvious that there was a serious insolvency issue at that time, because to think that a bank is actually insolvent, you really have to understand the loan book. If we're ... if we're operating on the commercial property side you have to, you know, evaluate the collateral, you have to evaluate the loan-to-value ratios, you have to evaluate whether the size of any capital losses are likely to eat through what would be the buffers of capital in place, and it's important to bear in mind, I think, that many of the ... of the catastrophic falls in the ... in the value, particularly of commercial property at the time, occurred subsequent to the introduction of ... of the guarantee. I mean, the fall in ... in the commercial property market, if my figures are right, were what was about 3% in quarter 1 of 2008, but the rate of ... of decline increased to about 15% in quarter 3, 2008, and about 19% in quarter 4, 2008. So, I think a lot of the destruction in value occurred subsequent to the introduction of the guarantee, and reflected, I think, in many respects, the meltdown, okay, in the financial markets as a whole. But they're also the read across to conditions in our local markets and in the economy here.