Mr. Richie Boucher:

I ... to be honest, I'm not sure whether there was a ... I think there was a, I think there was a belief that, like, the Government wasn't aware of the extent of the issues. There was a belief that the ... like, it wasn't explained to me. It was just said, "We're going". I mean, if I've learned, over my period of time, if you're going to meet a politician, you should have a pretty good idea in your mind what you're asking for, but, in fairness, like, we'd had the experience of Nationwide, what we'd seen at first hand, there were talks that morning about, you know, would we ... I understand, I wasn't at that meeting, would we consider Irish Permanent. Anglo had come in to us that afternoon to say, "We're going to default", that's effectively what they said, and my belief is, and my absolute belief is, that our chief executive and our chairman felt that they had to tell the Government something was going. If I read the testimony now, if I see that Mr. Gleeson has said that AIB had information that I don't think we had that day, I think our chairman decided they should ring up AIB and say, "Listen, we think we need to go to the Government. We think you should come." They agreed to go. But I don't think ... I wasn't conscious, as a member of ... a senior member of a committee-----