Mr. Richie Boucher:

I don't think we recognised it as the risk it was, Deputy. I think we believed that what other banks were doing, what the markets were doing, what advisers were doing, that securitisation was safe. It was a good way to do it. There's not a problem with securitisation, there's an over-reliance. I've given in earlier testimony, if I look back, I think that was the biggest single mistake and I think there was a fundamental flow in the sterling securitisation markets of sterling being a natural short currency and it had actually been financed in reality, in dollar markets. A number of other banks that had financed UK mortgages found out a similar issue. So I would say the biggest ... we made a lot of mistakes, Deputy, but our biggest mistake was a liquidity mistake. As it transpired, when the authorities were able to provide liquidity against collateral, our ability to ride through the liquidity crisis was better because we had that collateral, but the business model was flawed.