Mr. Eugene Sheehy:

Thank you. Just in general on remuneration. You know, there was a number of components to it and they were scientifically constructed. We had three external consultants who looked at it. And their methodology was to bring you into a peer group and a reference group and that was probably the biggest driver of the pay policy. I never asked and I don't know of any colleagues who ever asked the remuneration committee for a pay increase. It was kind of mechanically devolved out of a system of peer references.

And if you look at the Nyberg report you will see that AIB was much, much lower ... rather than ... of the peer group, in terms of size. So, there was a science to it. There wasn't executives going up, banging the door saying "I want more pay". It never happened. But the actual amounts that we were paid were too high ... I mean, when I came from the States I was paid a lot less over there, but they had a totally different philosophy about long-term compensation, so you could make a lot of money in the States as a bank executive if you stayed in an institution for a long time, because there was a huge upside in stock. Here there was ... actually it turned out, no upside in long-term compensation because the bar had to be ... was ... CPI plus 10% compound which is virtually impossible ... actually impossible to make, so they never vested it. I think once in ten years there might have been a small vesting. So there was flaws in the design, too much influence by peer reference, but there was no clamour among bank executives, the people who reported to me directly, for more pay.