Mr. Fabian Zuleeg:

I fully agree with the Mr. Freudenstein's final point which also applies in the trade sphere. A number of countries have made it abundantly clear that a country of the size of the United Kingdom, with its economic weight, would have a very different negotiating position from that of the European Union in international trade negotiations. To put the matter simply, the United Kingdom would be a price taker in such negotiations. There have been clear signs from the United States signalling strongly that a transatlantic trade and investment partnership, TTIP, is a far more attractive proposition if it is with the whole of the European Union, including the United Kingdom, and the United States is more willing to negotiate on that basis.

Unfortunately, I do not believe a UK exit from the European Union would strengthen the Common Foreign and Security Policy because the differences between countries in this area are too great. If we were thinking about longer term horizons, we might imagine changes in this area. However, the kinds of foreign policy position being taken by France and Germany, the other two big countries, are very far apart. It is difficult, therefore, to see how one would get more than co-ordination of foreign policy, which is what we have.

I will pick up on a couple of the points made concerning tensions in other countries. It is true that there could be difficulties in some smaller countries in terms of increased anti-European sentiment. In general, however, albeit not necessarily in every single case, there is a significant difference between the attitude to the European Union in the United Kingdom and attitudes in other countries. Most people outside the United Kingdom cannot imagine being outside the European Union, even in countries where there is considerable dissatisfaction. While they may have many grievances and want many changes made in certain areas, the idea of being completely outside the European Union is unimaginable for most. This is not the case in the United Kingdom where there is much more of an accounting view of the European Union, by which I mean that people ask what are the costs and benefits of membership. If the former outweigh the latter, they take the view that perhaps it would be better for the country to be outside the European Union. I do not believe the costs outweigh the benefits. On the contrary, the benefits of being inside the Union far outweigh the costs. A discussion of the benefits must form part of the debate around a British exit. We should emphasise that these are political as well as economic benefits.

One issue that must be taken into account is that a vote to leave the European Union in a referendum could have a very destabilising effect on Britain. For example, if different constituent parts of the United Kingdom were to vote differently in such a referendum, it could well result in its disintegration. The political costs and uncertainty arising from such a vote would be high.

On the issue of trade, the European Union does not need the United Kingdom more than the United Kingdom needs the European Union. When we consider the logic of markets, it is clear that the European Union is the big market and that the United Kingdom the small one. The small market needs access to the big one. It would be a disaster for the United Kingdom if it could not sell its manufacturing products in the rest of the European Union. For example, most of the UK car industry, one of its major industries, and the pharmaceutical industry are based on exports. All these types of industry would have major problems if market access were to become a problem. The balance of the economic weight is clearly in favour of the European Union. As I stated, however, a British exit from the European Union would cost both sides and is not, therefore, a positive scenario. In terms of negotiations, the United Kingdom would be in a weaker position.

On the effect of a British exit on decision making, we would clearly move towards a scenario, at least in the medium term, in which the European Union and the eurozone became the same. While one or two countries could hold out, economically, they would have very little autonomy of movement if one had major blocs. In terms of monetary policy decisions, Denmark, for example, must watch extremely closely what the European Central Bank is doing. If only some small countries which do not have economic weight remain outside the eurozone, a cohesive eurozone will emerge, although this does not mean that it would be any better at making decisions because making decisions on the way forward implies agreement on what should be the way forward. There is nothing to indicate that the eurozone is cohesive in terms of its opinions.

On the question of who wants the United Kingdom to remain in the European Union and who wants it to leave it, while one could discuss in some detail whether a British exit would be in the interests of certain countries, the general tenor which still comes through from all member states is that none of them wants the United Kingdom to leave the Union. Despite the fact that in some cases one could argue it might be in the interests of certain players to have the United Kingdom outside the European Union, none of the institutions or member states wants the United Kingdom to leave. Notwithstanding that the United Kingdom sometimes appears to believe the European Parliament should not exist, the Parliament also believes the United Kingdom should stay in the European Union.