Mr. Roland Freudenstein:

In respect of contagion and the reform process, there is the fear that if we think of this in terms of British opt-out, other member states would then demand their opt-outs.

Other member states would then demand their opt-outs. Obvious candidates would be the Czech Republic, Hungary and, possibly, Denmark. One of the strong arguments in the Brussels institutions and member state capitals against a fundamental renegotiation of Britain’s status in the European Union has always been that it would not be Britain alone, but that the whole edifice would unravel. This would result not only in a multi-speed but multi-status European Union. That has had a very limiting effect on the number of issues that Britain’s partners would be ready to discuss.

As much as Great Britain has already distanced itself in the Union, it has always had one leg in, one leg out. It was never as involved in the European integration process as some of the continental countries for fundamentally political reasons. On topics such as the EU budget and completing the Single Market, however, Britain has always been an ally of Germany. Even though it was outside the eurozone, on overall topics of economic governance, as well as recently on issues of subsidiarity and bringing decision-making procedures closer to the citizens, there was some kind of German-British alliance in the European Union, spoken or not spoken. There has been a certain closeness in that regard. I can say with some confidence that the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, would personally consider a Brexit a detrimental event for Germany. As I said in my opening statement, Germany would get numerically more powerful but, at the same time, become more isolated in the European Union by losing an important ally on some very crucial issues.

Why has the reform process not happened before? It is because some of the demands that the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, made in his Bloomberg speech go beyond Great Britain, striking a chord with political forces and citizens in other member states. Germany is not the only one. The Dutch Government has produced a list of issues on which there should be no further transfer of competences to the European institutions in the future. It is not the same as a renegotiation bid by the British Government but there are other member states in which the rise of populism and popular discontent with the way politics is made in Europe and in the European Union has led to some rethinking and re-evaluation of the principle of subsidiarity. That is not to talk about the southern tier where, as a consequence of the euro crisis, there is a strong anti-EU sentiment in the population. There is a feeling, however, in member states such as the Netherlands, Germany and some of the Scandinavian countries that if the British Government did not dramatise this issue so much, they would have something in common about which to talk. The desire to rethink some decision-making procedures is not isolated to Britain. That is why it is happening now and, to a certain degree, some of the British demands sound reasonable to other governments and certainly to some of centre-right parties in the European Union.

Would a Brexit be beneficial for Ireland? Would it lead to happier faces on the Continent? This is all speculation and I certainly do not want to answer the question about Ireland as that is for members to contemplate. As Fabian Zuleeg already said, some people in European institutions, continental member states and French-speaking countries would be actually happy about a British exit. That is not secret. That is not true, however, for the majority of citizens of the European Union. It has been increasingly difficult to make progress in European integration in every respect with a Britain that feels more disaffected. It must be remembered, however, British public opinion has been going up and down when it comes to Europe. In 1975, 67% of British citizens voted in favour of continued membership of the European Economic Community, shortly after its entry. There was a strong majority against EU membership, 70% or so, in the 1980s. The most pro-European moment in British public opinion was in 1991 when Margaret Thatcher left office. Since then, it has been going downhill. Britain has always been a difficult partner. However, when it comes to issues such as completing the Single Market, being an advocate of free trade and strong transatlantic relations, Britain has and continues to play a positive role. It depends on which areas are important to one, which country on the Continent to which one belongs, as well as political affiliation, if one considers a Brexit a more positive or more negative development. In the final account, a Brexit is considered vastly more negative than positively.

Regarding the eurozone versus the other currencies, on the surface it might look that decision-making will be easier after a Brexit. The rest of the currencies would become weaker. Sooner or later, Poland will also join the euro. Sweden and Denmark then will still remain outside the euro and probably not for long.