Mr. Martin Cooney:

When we addressed the committee in 2013, we were still in the middle of a reorganisation of the Reserve Defence Force following on from the value for money review. We touched on a number of items in our submission. We gave a high level overview of our issues with the value for money review. We indicated the value that the Reserve Defence Force brings to the State, the civilian skills that the Reserve Defence Force has at its disposal and we indicated we would seek an independent review of the Reserve Defence Force. We also expressed a view that there was a very real risk that, because of the value for money review and reorganisation of the Reserve Defence Force, the force would cease to exist by 2016.

The value for money review recommended that a further formal review of the Reserve Defence Force be conducted after a period of four years with a view to examining the utility and capacity levels and the progress of the reserve. We are now at the half way mark and we think it opportune to provide our views on what has transpired. We will do this under four main pillars: first, the introduction of key performance indicators; second, the structural conflict between the Permanent Defence Force and the Reserve Defence Force; third, recruitment; and fourth, the package of support required for the Reserve Defence Force.

These areas can be explored in depth with my colleagues during the question and answer session. I ask for the indulgence of members as I can give them the view of the Army Reserve but not of the Naval Service reserve. I will invite my colleague Mr Colgan to make some points in that regard when I finish.

While we have always objected to the premise for the latest reorganisation, we do have to commend the Defence Force on how it has approached its task.

As always, it has demonstrated that leadership in change management, so much so that the administrative order that was to change the Reserve Defence Force was issued the same month as the value for money review was published. That was a very quick timeframe. It was not formalised until 2013, but this is the document that governed the restructuring in the Reserve Defence Force and what was to happen thereafter. A core tenet of this administrative order is what is known as “the single Force concept”. This entailed the disestablishment of Army Reserve and Naval Service Reserve units and the insertion of Reserve elements into permanent units. The theory behind that is that a single chain of command would allow greater scope for collective training and operational effectivenes.
The administrative instruction also sets out how the new Reserve Defence Force is to operate and identifies a number of key performance indicators against which Reserve Defence personnel will be evaluated. These are used to assess the individual effectiveness of members of the Reserve Defence Force. They consist of a number of criteria, which include paid and unpaid training, a medical test, a fitness test and an annual personal weapons test. The concept of objective measurement criteria is welcomed within the Reserve. It is not something to which we are adverse. It should serve as a true measure of the output of the organisation and it also serves as a motivational aspect that can individual reservists seek to achieve and obtain. However, any such criteria must be realistic and achievable, and adequate resources must be given to personnel in order to achieve them. Unfortunately, this has not been the case and there is a number issues with the key performance criteria that have been imposed on the Reserve Defence Force. These issues relate both to the criteria themselves and to the method in which they have been implemented.
I will not go into the merits of the key performance indicators, but I would like to explore some of the issues that we have encountered when we have tried to achieve them. At the outset, the Reserve Defence Force has been imposed upon permanent units, so immediately there is a mismatch between the working hours of each element. Whilst the terms of service of the Permanent Defence Force are 24-7, in reality the usual working hours outside of operational duties or training are Monday to Friday, 9 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. For the Reserve, on the other hand, the majority of the training is conducted in the evenings or at weekends in order to accommodate our civilian employment and our other obligations. This presents an immediate problem when it comes to the administration of the key performance indicators. For example, if I have to undergo a medical test it will be conducted by the Medical Corps, which operates during normal working hours.
The test consists of two parts, with each part conducted on two different days. My fitness test consists of three parts, with the first two parts conducted on one day and the third part on another. Another two days are now gone. Additionally, if the permanent unit conducts its annual range practice, where I am tested on my weapon, on a weekday, I have now potentially used up five days of annual leave to satisfy administrative requirements. That is essentially a reservist using up 25% of his or her statutory annual leave entitlement on administrative matters. That is without taking into account the fact that we may be called up for full-time training. If I do one period of full-time training, I have now used up 50% of my annual leave, and if I try to do a career course, which is generally structured over two weeks, I will have used up 75% of my statutory leave entitlement. It is a ridiculous situation; reservists cannot be expected to meet this. We cannot be expected to use up our annual leave on administrative tasks. It is an unreasonable expectation, particularly where there is no legislation to protect reservists in their civilian employment. In addition, we are being asked to meet these criteria without the same support that our permanent colleagues have. We are not entitled to the same medical care or benefits and we do not have the access to facilities that they have. It is specifically set out in the administrative instruction that reservists will not be afforded the facilities or time to train for these key performance indicators during full-time training. All responsibility lies with the reservists, in their own time, and that is something that cannot be said for their permanent colleagues.
When the next review is conducted, the cold figures will indicate that a certain percentage of reservists have not met their key performance indicators. No investigation will be conducted into what actually occurred, or into the organisational and administrative obstacles that were put in reservists' way. Nor will anything be said in regard to the personal time and sacrifice that was required to meet these criteria. Instead, the criteria will be used to denigrate reservists and will completely ignore the fact that the process has been implemented in a way that was completely unworkable.
What is particularly striking is that are no similar key performance indicators for our permanent colleagues. The Reserve Defence Force is a training output of the Permanent Defence Force. Our standards should reflect on the input of the Permanent Defence Force. When assessing the output of any service, surely it would make sense to assess the service provider. Yet again the regime is set up to scrutinise the reservists and we must stand up and be counted. There is no similar situation for our permanent colleagues, who will say they have training standards to meet each year which include accounting for the Reserve. This is a circular argument because they will use the key performance indicators of the Reserve to see whether or not they have made their training output. Our fear is that, as happened in the last Value for Money report, questions will not be asked as to what our permanent colleagues did or did not do in respect of the Reserve. Instead, there will be a focus on the Reserve failing to meet its objectives. When we fail, as is already pre-determined, the true problems will conveniently be ignored. Reservists face eventual discharge for failing to meet their key performance indicators but the same cannot be said of our permanent colleagues if they fail in their obligations to the Reserve.
I would like to speak about the structural conflict between the Permanent Defence Force and the Reserve Defence Force. Aside from the issues with key performance indicators, we have to contend with the difficulties of dealing with a full-time professional Force as part-time professionals. There is no doubt in our minds that there is commitment to the Reserve Defence Force at the very highest levels in the Defence Forces. The General Staff has indicated that it is committed to making this work. The addition of Reserve elements to permanent units represents an additional workload on top of the existing workload, with no incentive or reward in return. We noted when we were last before this committee that the loss of the cadre staff was significant in terms of the loss of experience and knowledge. It appeared to us that the reorganisation was being pushed through in a very tight timeframe without adequate consideration of the inherent differences between both organisations. Many of our concerns have proven justified.
The reorganisation was supposed to be implemented by 30 March 2013, yet in 2014 we were still dealing with issues arising from it. As the reorganisation progressed, it was very evident that there were significant issues in the records and administration of the Reserve Defence Forces and this impeded the smooth transition of the Reserve into the permanent Defence Forces. On top of this, many of the cadre staff retired and, with them, their knowledge and experience was lost. Permanent units were left to grapple with an administration system with which they were not familiar and on which they were not trained. As a result, reservists have suffered delays in pay, restrictions on training and denial of entitlements. Greater demands are being placed on reservists in respect of training during normal working hours so that they can train with their permanent colleagues. By no means is this a criticism of the permanent Defence Force. It would be unrealistic to expect someone to work all week and then come in again in the evenings or at weekends for no extra incentive or reward. The irony is that this is exactly what reservists are expected to do. We have gone to a situation where our rewards and incentives have been taken away and the incentive is more “stick” than “carrot” at this point.
Compounding this is the problem that the complete military legislative and administrative structure to govern the reorganised Reserve has not been put in place. It is astounding that 20 months into the reorganisation, we are still working under old administrative systems which do not take account of the reorganisation or the increased standards and commitment required of the Reserve. There is an inconsistency between the old regulations and the newly introduced key performance indicators and this has led to confusion as to what governs reservists and what happens if reservists do not meet their key performance indicators.

As a result of the knowledge deficit the permanent units have been forced to do the best they can under the circumstances. Unfortunately, this has resulted in a lack of uniformity of decisions, with unit commanders taking varying approaches to clothing, equipment, training, recording of training hours, development of courses and limits on paid training. Depending on their unit, some reservists have been able to engage in training that was beyond their wildest dreams and others have suffered through what we would term "malicious obedience" on the part of middle management, whereby the focus is on attaining key performance indicators, with no advancement of reservists' military skills or training.

On the issue of recruitment, the administrative instruction for the organisation identifies that a priority for it will be whether it can maintain the level of quality recruitment necessary to staff the Reserve Defence Force for the next 3–5 years. The establishment of the Reserve Defence Force went from 9,500 to 4,069. By January 2014 we were already 1,200 under strength. The current strength is 1,734. In order to meet our establishment by 2016, we must recruit 2,335 reservists. This represents a figure of over 1,000 recruits a year, which would prove a difficult task for full-time personnel and absolutely out of reach for part-time professionals. Simply put, the resources are not there to train that number of people in this time period. The Reserve Defence Force will not be able to meet this and the shortcomings in its previous administration by its permanent staff meant that the numbers on the books never reflected the numbers in reality.

On a positive note, a recruitment campaign ran from March to April 2014. This was a very professional campaign and was run through a combination of national and regional press media, social media and national careers portal. It was the first time that a campaign for the Reserve Defence Forces was run in a centralised manner. The media campaign was very positive and progressive and it represented an innovative approach to the use of many and varied forms of social media and serves only to underscore the professionalism expected in the Reserve Defence Force today. The "single force" concept was reinforced by the fact that there was no difference between the campaign for reservists and the Permanent Defence Force and there was no sense of disparity in the value that either arm of the Defence Forces provides to the State. Objective bystanders would have obtained an impression of a young, professional combined force with plenty of opportunities for the young, willing and able.

Nevertheless, there were some disadvantages to the approach. Advertising for both the Permanent Defence Force and the Reserve Defence Force on the same platform caused confusion. This was compounded by the fact that applicants were directed to the Defence Forces’ website where the application process was conducted under the "careers" section. The Army Reserve and the Naval Service Reserve have their own dedicated sections of this website and it would have been logical for applications for either element to go through that. However, it went through the careers section, which caused confusion for people who are less knowledgeable about the Defence Forces. In addition, service in the Reserve is not technically a career. This added to the confusion. From our research, we know that certain applicants erroneously applied for the Reserve when they had intended to apply for the Permanent Defence Force.

Successful applicants then progressed to the assessment stage of the campaign. The assessments consisted of a fitness test, interview and medical exam. Again, this is a positive development for the Reserve Defence Force as it demonstrates a professional approach to the recruitment and selection of appropriate candidates for the Reserve. This assessment process is usually the first time these candidates meet face-to-face and the process reinforces the fact that candidates are joining a modern and well-equipped Defence Force. However, issues arose at this stage whereby candidates for the Reserve Defence Force were treated in a similar manner to candidates for the Permanent Defence Force. Some were given short notice of medical tests and interviews. Interviews were conducted during the working week which meant that those in employment had to take leave from work to attend.

To its credit, the Permanent Defence Force has learned from the early campaign and is implementing a new recruitment campaign that has taken on some of our recommendations. Unfortunately it does not take away from the fact that of two recruitment campaigns in 2014, one was flawed and the other will not provide output until 2015. We are therefore in a situation where we cannot reach our established strength by 2016 and we believe that this will again be pointed to as a failure on the part of the Reserve.

We would like to make it clear that we embrace the single Force concept and its ideals. However, this concept cannot be implemented successfully by the Defence Forces alone. It requires a robust and holistic approach based on four pillars. In order to have a viable and effective Reserve Defence Force, we need a complete package which includes a shift in Government defence policy, legislative underpinning and engagement with employers.

This approach will require bravery. It requires the same type of courage demonstrated by the current Chief of Staff in the reorganisation of the Reserve Defence Force. This courage is now also required on the part of politicians, such as this committee. As it stands, the Reserve Defence Force is being set up to fail - the outcome of the next review is virtually preordained. The authors of the value for money review have been quite clever. They did not get their way the first time, so they have set up a structure whereby, at the next review, they will sit back and say “We told you so”. That is sad on so many levels.

With the Chair's indulgence, I would like to ask Mr. Eoin Colgan to make some remarks.