Mr. John Redmond:

The AGSI has the best interests of An Garda Síochána and the public at heart. The men and women at sergeant and inspector rank are honest, hardworking, committed and dedicated to their roles in An Garda Síochána. They have demonstrated this by studying in their own time and passing at least six legal, policing and management exams and by having been successful in a minimum of four promotion interviews. These people are the first line supervisors and managers and play a pivotal role in the running of the Garda organisation.

That An Garda Síochána must be open to scrutiny, examination and oversight is a given for AGSI members. The processes, however, must be clear and the guidelines under which this oversight is carried out must be adhered to. It cannot be a case of "make it up as you go along" with timeframes and fair procedures cast aside at will. The Garda Síochána Act 2005 sought to codify and to integrate the organisation into one statute. From a discipline point of view, I refer to the most significant changes within the Act. The introduction of section 39, statutory duty to account, was brought about in the aftermath of the disclosures in the Morris tribunal, which was ongoing at the time, and, in particular, in respect of difficulties senior officers had espoused by reason of the fact that members of An Garda Síochána would not answer questions or would not "account". Prior reasoning was that a member did not want to incriminate himself or herself or to provide information which may lead to a disciplinary process. This was always misconceived and in the normal relationship that exists between an employer and employee, the duty to account applies as a matter of law.

This section was amended by section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2005. In practice this appears to work but it has also been open to abuse.

It has led to the use of the section to compel individuals in the disciplinary process. That is to say that after the process of the disciplinary regulations has been initiated, the deciding officer, investigator or otherwise invokes this section which clearly should not be the case. It is a breach of discipline not to comply with a properly made direction but it should be clarified that this section cannot be invoked in the disciplinary process as that process is fully covered in the 2007 regulations.

The Garda Síochána (Discipline) Regulations 2007 came into operation on 1 June 2007. They brought in a two-tier element for minor and non-minor breaches of the discipline regulations. The general disciplining particularly on the non-minor side has been open to abuse where it has become simply a paper exercise and used in circumstances to discipline individuals within a division without any real recourse. The procedure is that the appointing officer appoints the deciding officer. In the very nature of how this is organised, there is a degree of prejudgment, particularly where no specific reasons are given, and in the decisions no reference is made to the facts relied on or ignored in reaching the decisions.

The review by the appointing officer is even less effective and I am not aware of any review that was successful save for maybe a reduction in a fine or other disciplinary action or allowing of a review in respect of one of a number of breaches otherwise upheld. The process should be more open and transparent and not be dealt with within the Garda division in which the person under investigation is working. Any determination of facts in any event should be dealt with where the Garda member gets a fair hearing and puts forward his or her case and cross-examines where necessary. This is simply not available to them at this time in this process. Importantly, a person should be entitled at an interview in respect of these minor breaches to have their legal representative present.

Regarding standard of proof, in the discipline regulations a breach is to be established on the balance of probabilities. Clearly, the balance of probabilities is what applies in civil law; in other words, one proves, for example, 51% in favour of a particular proposition and then on that basis the balance is tipped in favour of the proponent. Obviously, when dealing with breaches of discipline and in particular the serious ones, this leaves us with 49% possible doubt which does not arise in this standard but which has grave effects on a Garda member, including dismissal from his or her position. Consideration should be given in the more serious matters to establishing the proofs beyond a reasonable doubt when an individual's career is in the balance.

Suspension is another area of contention where there is no readily available review of a suspension order when a member of An Garda Síochána is subject to an inquiry - either discipline or criminal. There are clearly no guidelines given concerning suspension save that the opinion of the Commissioner having regard to the circumstances when rendering such a course desirable is in the interests of An Garda Síochána. This is noticeable with internal investigations and also those being governed by GSOC. There are huge delays in our legal representatives' dealings with GSOC. In the case of one member who is currently suspended, long after the initial investigation was notified the AGSI solicitor is unable to obtain a proper update from GSOC or enter a process where the AGSI client can make submissions concerning the lifting of the suspension which would have regard to factors in the case, including the nature of the alleged offence or breach, delay, etc.

The rate of pay of a Garda member on suspension must be dealt with as a matter of urgency. All civil servants who face suspension are automatically granted suspension allowance or pay at 100%. A garda is allowed 75% of basic pay, or following intense scrutiny of his or her financial situation, a maximum of 90% of basic pay. This of course is not 75% of the garda's pay, as allowances make up almost 24% of his or her pay. This provision must be regularised to bring An Garda Síochána into line with others in the public service. The suspension of staff occurs more often in An Garda Síochána than in other agencies. It must be remembered that in penalising the garda by the reduction in suspension allowance as occurs at present, the garda's spouse and children are also penalised, which is wrong.

The 2005 Act contains several features which should bring about proper oversight of the workings of the organisation. We have strategy statements, annual reports, a three-year review report, a professional standards unit, joint policing committees, section 43 accountability, the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission and the Garda Inspectorate. Each of the sections and parts of the Act set out the various frameworks.

It seems to be that several organisations should be merged into one and that An Garda Síochána through the Commissioner should answer to an independent body such as a Garda authority which is wholly independent of the Department of Justice and Equality and the Minister. The make up of this authority and the selection of people to serve on such authority are vital. At present, the Government is keen to make all the decisions, which is a cause of concern to the AGSI. It is suggested that a group of Deputies representing all parties consider the formulation Garda authority. It would seem that a committee such as this one would fit this requirement.

I wish to make a few additional points.