Mr. John Devitt:

I am not sure the problem in the US or the UK centres or focuses on institutional design. To some degree there is a risk of member capture, for example, in the US, the Members of Congress might become too close to those who are briefing them. The director of national intelligence, the National Security Agency or the Central Intelligence Agency may develop close relationships with members of congressional oversight committees. There have been allegations that these committees are too close to the intelligence agencies they oversee. The problem in the UK and the US has been that members of the intelligence services have limited recourse to report to others outside those committees.

Edward Snowden, in a contract for the NSA, could not avail of rights to report to Members of Congress. Members of NSA or CIA who have reported to Members of Congress have been subject to disciplinary action. This will not be solved by establishing an intelligence oversight committee but will require a panoply of reforms and the introduction of rights for whistleblowers to report outside those committees, as is planned under the protected disclosures legislation, to allow members of the intelligence services to report to a Minister. It is important that members of the intelligence services, whether they work for the Defence Forces or the Garda Síochána, would be able to report their concerns, even when they relate to national security, to more than one body.