Mr. Simon O'Brien:

That is of concern to us. Obviously the Deputy will be aware that even since the report was given to me just before Christmas, and prior to that, we were already building our firewalls up higher. We were starting to look at the learning we were taking even from just the first connection with the security experts. This was all about internal sweeps of the building, external looks at where the threats might come from, even just being overlooked.

One of the potential issues I did talk about was asking questions of security experts of what capability could be ranged against us. Without giving too much away, I was shocked to think about the level of threat that came with mobile telephony and all of those issues we are now taking back into our risk management systems. We are where we are today. I hope we can move past this, but in terms of our surveillance operation, by definition, it should, if it is successful, remain very very imprecise. If one is the subject of surveillance and one has any knowledge of that surveillance, the surveillance is failing. Any person undertaking surveillance would want to make sure that at the end of the surveillance operation the situation remained completely imprecise. That is where we find ourselves; we have no precision; we have suspicion. We have suspected activity and nothing, in my view and professional judgment, would have got past the threshold test to say we had an offence.