Rónán Mullen (Independent)
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Perhaps the experts would all agree with me that it probably is unfair to challenge an expert, given the pressure of time here, for allegedly ignoring the human element. Perhaps even Mrs. Justice McGuinness would agree with me that precise distinctions of law must be made sometimes to ensure the law is an instrument of compassion and not one of injustice, as that is what is at stake here.

On the housekeeping question I have asked of all witnesses, I note this morning Deputy Durkan raised the bizarre proposition that lawyers might sometimes be coloured by their personal opinions. I acknowledge that in his submission, Mr. Callanan mentioned he is a trustee of the Fine Gael Party and Professor Binchy has mentioned his long association with the Pro Life Campaign. However, purely as a matter of housekeeping, may I ask whether any witnesses present were consulted in the wake of the expert group report, in the context of the preparation of these heads of legislation? Ought they, in the spirit of full disclosure, declare whether they have any party, political or past or present campaign or lobby group affiliation? This is not to judge anyone but simply to allow members to consider everything in the round.

Has Mr. Callanan misunderstood what Dr. Cahill is saying in respect of the Cosma case? As I understood it, she was not saying it subtracted from the X case decision or the real and substantial risk test but rather, that it specified, as it were, an interpretive key that must now be used and that what she had to say about the Cosma decision raises implications for Mr. Callanan's analysis of the heads of this Bill, in that they are not sufficiently specific in terms of establishing whether a person meets the real and substantial risk criterion. Perhaps he might comment on this point. A real issue that has emerged today, as in previous days, is the huge difference of opinion among eminent people. In particular, it appears that the law is changing in one respect, in that the law of unforeseen consequences may apply in respect of the question of term limits and members may indeed be looking at a case in the future where this legislation could be challenged. I have not heard that proposition challenged but I invite Professor Binchy to comment briefly on Mr. Callanan's submission, both at page 3 and page 6, where, in respect of the former, he suggests the Supreme Court in 1996, in the Article 26 reference, did dispose of the argument that X was not properly decided by reference to the fact that medical issues were not fully canvassed. Is this a different question from stating it was not fully decided, in the sense expressed by Dr. Cahill?