Dr. Rory O'Donnell:

Our focus in thinking about the institutional arrangements very much reflects our characterisation of the climate change policy problem. It involves, in broad terms, both the need for stronger political and societal will in all countries on the one side and innovation and the introduction of new technologies, along with fine-grain learning, on the other. The problem requires both as they are critical in thinking about the institutions, because if we drop one of those, there will be a simple solution that will either enforce political will and tie the hands of future governments or leave it to the market. Neither of those will work.

The entity we have outlined involves an attempt both to drive and to capture change where it really happens. In our study, we have observed and reported change in numerous organisations, such as Glanbia, An Bord Bia, Bewley's, Celtic Linen and other companies. These firms are innovating, and the question is what institutional mechanism would lead to a public entity being built in a way that pushes other organisations to innovation and assists them in doing it while learning from them. Hence the entity described in our note, which would have the elements of a high level board supported by a technical secretariat, both of which would be connected to networks which would tend to have an agency at its centre. Teagasc works with large numbers of farmers and food organisations; the SEAI works with firms, big and small, and communities; and other agencies work within different networks. Our institution is designed to reflect both the dimension of the need for drive and political will. As the Deputy said, the centre cannot solve problems it knows less about than front-line actors.

Our institutional design may be similar in many respects to what is in the heads of the Bill, but it differs in a number of others. I will elaborate on that if the committee wishes me to do so. The institutional entity we describe, as with that described in the heads of Bill, is more of the system than entirely independent. For example, it has the heads of the Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, the SEAI and Teagasc among its members. It has a role in assisting the formulation of both the national and sectoral roadmaps or plans. It is also similar in having an information gathering role and undertaking research, and it also has the right to create committees or teams to probe more deeply into specific problems.

Our proposal differs somewhat in a number of other respects. Whereas the heads of the Bill see the body being supported by EPA staff, we suggest that it be supported by a small, technical secretariat drawn from a range of agencies, including the SEAI, the EPA, Teagasc and other relevant entities. This reflects the need for this secretariat and its senior board to push a range of agencies and their networks, whether they are in farming, energy generation, transport, etc. The heads of the Bill describe the expert body as facing mainly towards government - if I understand it correctly - and delivering advice to the Minister and others, but we suggest a body that would be in one sense closer to government. For example, it could be chaired by a Cabinet Minister. Equally, it should also face outwards to agencies and networks, where the real action, innovation and rich knowledge reside.

Those two perspectives have subtle differences.

They could be combined. Indeed, as John McCarthy says, the note on head 7 says that the text is designed to give as much flexibility and right of initiation as possible to the body, while maintaining the clear role of the Government. We believe it is important at this critical moment to think openly, creatively and explicitly about the whole constellation of actors and entities, not leaving their interaction to chance.

We all know that national policies and strategies frequently disappoint. Although the policy advice and the idea seems good, something down the pipeline does not work. This can be for several reasons. One reason is that in some sense the front-line agency or Department that is due to deliver is not really brought in or does not understand what the policy is. Another reason is that although the policy looks good, when people try to implement it, there are glitches that make it hard to implement. In the traditional system of public administration it is hard to feed that information back up and to get policies, regulations and governing frameworks changed. We are very anxious that the entity that is created will create an architecture that gives the front line some upward reach into the system, what we call a clearing house, which helps to identify roadblocks, be they technical, legal or political, that nobody foresaw but which make it hard to implement the policy.

Those are the somewhat subtle ways in which the ideas differ, but we know that given the difficulty of making policy work and do what we want it to do, we must think very carefully about those issues.