Ms Tija Memi?evi?:

Ladies and gentlemen, let me thank the members of the Joint Committee on European Affairs for the opportunity to address them. Given that Ireland will host the Presidency in January makes this an even more important opportunity. The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is dire and I welcome this hearing as an opportunity to recruit more support for the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina and their future in the European Union. I am putting the emphasis on the citizens and the reason will become very clear when I present my statement. The record of Ireland in dealing with the Western Balkans and Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular, makes me firmly believe I am sitting among friends today.

I am here as the representative of the civic society in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, more important, that part of civic society which stands for European values and standards. I emphasise this intentionally because this part of civic society in Bosnia-Herzegovina has not been recognised as a partner in the process of European integration. This may sound counter-intuitive, especially judging from the experiences in central and eastern Europe in the 1990s but there is nothing typical regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina, so the dynamic of such relationships is not typical as well. The dynamic relationship between the EU and the Bosnian political structures excludes the citizens and undermines the civic society development and efforts, as they are both perceived as unpredictable elements which can disturb the said relationship. The dominant premise is, even in 2012 which I think is critical, to give priority to stabilisation over democratisation. Needless to say, there will never be stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina nor in any other place for that matter, without the substantial democratisation of society.

Over the years, and especially in the past seven years, the representatives of the European Union and many of its members states have developed a pathological relationship with Bosnian politicians. Bosnian politicians have no interest in EU integration whatsoever, as my colleagues also pointed out in their presentations, and threaten and generate political crises. In response the European Union enters into prolonged negotiations which end in meeting their demands, which I call basically handing out the candies. The resulting deals fall far short of EU standards and norms.

To give but one brief example, in 2011, Milorad Dodik, President of Republika Srpska, threatened to call a referendum on the entire state judicial structure on the territory of that entity. The prime objective was to undermine the authority of the state court, the state prosecutor and the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council. At the time, it is very import to note, there was an ongoing investigation on Mr. Dodik, so there was a realistic possibility that he could be prosecuted in that court. On 13 May 2011, the High Commissioner Catherine Ashton travelled to Banja Luka with the offer of a so-called 'structured dialogue' on justice reform between the European Union and Bosnia-Herzegovina in exchange for Dodik's calling off the referendum. Such a referendum would probably never happen, which is important to keep in mind, since once that card was played, it would cease to be a useful tool of blackmail. Ever since, the 'dialogue' has served as a mechanism for politicians in Bosnia-Herzegovina to exert political pressure on the judiciary and dismantle the results already achieved in justice reform, but with the European Union as an accomplice, unfortunately.

The European Union is conditioned to respond in this way. It concedes before politicians even threaten and blackmail. The European Union is in the business of reading their minds and self-censoring. However, EU representatives do not understand one crucial point, namely there is no bottom line to demands and threats by Bosnian politicians since they do not seek reasonable compromise under the given rules of the game; they really want to postpone integration into the European Union indefinitely. Their actions are perfectly rational since the existing system provides them with unprecedented privileges and control. I do not have to point out how detrimental such a relationship is to the mechanism of conditionality, which has proved over time to be the most significant tool in democratic and economic transformation of the society and its readiness to join the European Union.

This dynamic is visible in many other processes and activities besides the 'structure dialogue'. The notion that Bosnia-Herzegovina must have a "co-ordination mechanism" in order to reach state level consensus so that it can speak with one voice with the European Union is yet another political mechanism with the purpose of stalling the reform. Not only does the European Union accept this canard, it has adopted it as its own. The major question is what is there to talk, negotiate and reach consensus about while talking about adopting the acquis communautaire? By choosing benchmarks such as police reform, implementing the outcome of the Sejdić-Finci case, and so on, the European Union also adds to the tension of citizens who wait in suspense for yet another critical political agreement while all other necessary reforms are placed on hold. Such benchmarks, are without exception, served yet again with calls for compromise - a signal that the game is on, a whistle marking the beginning of long holidays for politicians who will pretend for the next five years to negotiate. The result will, as usual, fall significantly short of EU standards and norms, but the European Union will nevertheless greet the agreement with relief.

In its obsession with stability, the EU representatives will extend inappropriate political support to politicians whose power is fading as citizens' disappointment grows. This is why European Union Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle, while on an official visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina, made sure to visit Milorad Dodik, President of Republika Srpska first before any other state official in a restaurant in Lukavica near Sarajevo, despite the fact that his party lost the recent local elections.

This example brings me to another important point. Štefan Füle was on an official visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Would it not be appropriate if he publicly addressed citizens and their representatives in the Parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina instead of having talks in a restaurant behind closed doors? Many political deals in Bosnia have been made in bars and restaurants with and among the heads of the parties. This practice of circumventing the institutions and accepting political deals reached without going on record must stop. I need not elaborate on the reasons.

The recent political agreement between the social democratic SDP and SNSD, Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, which negatively affects numerous areas of reform, including the judiciary, elections, economy and finance, have also been reached behind closed doors. What is known about the content of the agreement, that is what parties deem sufficient to publish, indicates that their intention is to undermine the existing reform achievements, assume more institutional and social control, put the state in debt and prepare the ground for influencing the results of the next election. The fact that they want to push the agreement through the Parliament through urgent procedure just increases the suspicion among citizens that they are up to no good. Nevertheless the response by international bodies and individual EU member states, with few notable exceptions, have been neutral to positive.

At the same time, between 75% and 90% of citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina support EU membership. One may rightly ask why this massive support never translated into change of political and social narrative towards the EU integration. The answer is, unfortunately, simple. Half of the citizens who support EU membership of Bosnia-Herzegovina make it a condition of their support with demands and ideas incompatible with membership. The reason that citizens do not understand the process and therefore cannot rationally recognise their interest in the process is because politicians control the narrative of European Union integration. They have no interest in having informed citizens and consequently having to take over responsibility for the reforms and be judged by citizens according to achieved results. The EU institutions present in Bosnia-Herzegovina have not done much to develop communication directly with its citizens.

Under the existing relationship between the EU and local politicians, authentic civic society organisations have been perceived as undesired disturbance in otherwise harmonious and stable relationship. When the Initiative for Freedom of Declaration, founded by large group of organisations and individuals initiated the campaign for census questionnaire to change so to allow for freedom of expression in so-called identity questions, nationality, ethnicity, religion and language it met with resistance from both politicians and the EU representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Once the politicians reached agreement to hold a census, both the European Union and the local elites were bent on avoiding public scrutiny. Anybody raising concerns could have potentially caused the postponement of the process. Never mind that census undertaken "under any circumstances" would have far reaching consequences and created insurmountable obstacles to future reforms.

What can be done to change the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina? First, the European Union does not take into consideration the economic and financial aspects of the crisis. Popular support for political parties, considering the poor economic performance and exceptionally high unemployment rate, has been based on public spending. It is reasonable to assume that more than half of the voters for each of the political parties are so-called clients, citizens who cast their vote for a party because their economic and financial security depends on it. The high level of institutional control of all branches of government by political parties and the equally high level of corruption enable parties to serve and demand support from clients. At the same time, parties are running out of money for public spending and serving the clientele. Both entities, especially Republika Srpska, have borrowed heavily in the past year, including from commercial banks and by issuing bonds. Funds from the European Union and international financial institutions in which EU member states have a stake should come with a long list of reform-related conditions attached. At least some of these commitments should be met prior to disbursement of the money.

Second, EU representatives should back civic sector efforts which advocate EU values and standards against local politicians who so far have not been accountable to anyone. They have not been under real pressure from anyone. They have been in a position to wield control over both the European Union and citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Backing authentic civic efforts would immediately create pressure from both directions.

Third, EU representatives, EU institutions, especially MEPs and the parliaments of individual member states, should improve direct communication with citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They are the primary partners and beneficiaries of reforms and EU membership and should be treated accordingly.