Professor David Phinnemore:

I thank the committee for the invitation to address it today. I have provided a written statement, which is quite lengthy, but I am going to draw out five key points from it, touching on the TCA and the protocol. The first point is that post-Brexit relations between the EU and the UK have been characterised by considerable political tension. Much of this is the result of the UK Government under Boris Johnson failing to come to terms with the consequences of the policy choices it made in implementing the result of the 2016 referendum. In leaving the EU customs union and the Single Market and hastily settling for a zero tariff-zero quota free trade arrangement, as part of a hastily concluded and comparatively minimalist trade and co-operation agreement, the disruptive effects of Brexit, which is an inherently disruptive process, have been far greater than many anticipated. I would argue that the UK is still coming to terms with the consequences of the choices it made, and this is likely to continue irrespective of who is in government.

The second point I would make is that the effect of UK Government policy choices has been to ensure significant disruption to UK trade with the EU, and the end of UK-EU co-operation in almost all areas of policy. While the TCA provided for a dense institutional framework for managing relations, its various committees have only slowly been established and there have generally been few meetings. The institutional framework also lacks a high-level political forum for the strategic development of relations, which is a reflection of the Johnson Government’s preference for minimal post-Brexit engagement with the EU. That may need to change to facilitate the development of relations. Related to the protocol on the issue of institutional framework, a framework is in place to ensure the challenges associated with the unique circumstances on the island of Ireland can be addressed through the protocol. The protocol tensions clearly need to be resolved and we also need to see that the unique institutional framework that has been established is operating. I can go into more detail on that if necessary. Currently, its core institutional arrangements, such as joint committees, a specialised committee, and a joint consultative working group, are not meeting, with the exception of the latter. Picking up on Professor Hayward's point, the formalisation and regularisation of the ad hoc yet effective stakeholder engagement needs to be established with business representatives and representatives of civil society. This is yet to be formalised and institutionalised.

The third point I want to make relates to the question of opinion on the protocol. Clearly, what we have in Northern Ireland is political positions on the protocol moving from broadening acceptance of the protocol in 2020 and into 2021, to a situation where today among strong unionists in particular, there is considerable opposition to the protocol and a preference among many unionists for its scrapping. Recent polling we have carried out has found that in forthcoming elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, almost one quarter of voters would vote for candidates in favour of scrapping the protocol. However, non-unionist political parties are generally supportive of the protocol and successive polls indicate a narrow majority of voters in favour of the protocol. A clear majority of 71% agreed in polling last month that a negotiated UK-EU settlement of outstanding issues regarding implementation of the protocol is preferable to the UK taking unilateral action.

The fourth point is looking at the fact that the protocol is about more than just trade. It includes obligations regarding the functioning of the single electricity market, as well as the maintaining of conditions for North-South co-operation on the island of Ireland. As yet, limited attention has been paid to assessing whether such conditions are being maintained. It is also of note that, despite the objective of avoiding a hard border, the protocol's actual yet unstated focus is on avoiding a physical hardening of the border. Since the end of the transition period at the end of 2020, during which the UK remained in the EU internal market and part of the free movement of goods, services and capital, concerns have increased that a hardening of the border is taking place at least as far as the movement of services and people is concerned. Limited attention has as yet been paid to determining how and whether such concerns can and should be addressed through the protocol.

My final point relates to the issue that if the outstanding issues between the UK and the EU are resolved, any abating of the political tension around the protocol may be short-lived. In 2024, members of the Northern Ireland Assembly, whether it is sitting or not, will be offered the opportunity to vote as part of the protocol's democratic consent process.

That will determine where the core features of the protocol, related to the free movement of goods, continue to apply. While at present it appears likely that a simple majority will vote in favour of consent, the vote is just as likely to serve as a reminder of the political divisions that exist in Northern Ireland on the protocol. If consent is granted by only a simple majority, MLAs will be invited to return to the issue again in 2028. A key challenge for the UK and the EU is how to manage the politicisation of the protocol and this process around democratic consent.