Professor Brendan O'Leary:

If I could summarise within three minutes all the arguments in my recently published book, Making Sense of a United Ireland, then I would not have written it. Let me instead headline two key matters. The first is adequate planning. Sovereign Ireland is not prepared for Irish unification at the end of this decade. Neither for the dual referendums that will likely occur, nor for the momentous statecraft required to put two positive votes for unity into effect. To prepare properly is the minimal courtesy owed to Irish citizens and possible future citizens among Northern unionists, others and Northern nationalists. Nothing less than a ministry of national reunification is required. The South Koreans have one, should we not? The ministry should have reach across all Departments because reunification will affect all of them. It should be complemented by a standing constitutional forum organised by both Houses of the Oireachtas that sits in plenary for one month of every year, empowered to assess opinion and propose appropriate legislative or constitutional change.

We also require a sovereign wealth transition fund for short-run transition costs and for all-island infrastructure, broadly conceived. Though the scale of the subvention of Northern Ireland by Great Britain is exaggerated, it is prudent to be prepared for adverse possibilities. Minimally, the fund should receive 25% more than we give annually in international aid.

Second, the Government of Ireland faces a future dilemma. Before the referendums, should it propose a specific constitutional model of Irish unification? Any such specific model - for example, an integrated Ireland or a united Ireland in which a devolved Northern Ireland persists - would have to be accompanied by contingent constitutional amendments or draft legislation to go into effect after the positive votes in favour of unity. The key advantage of this approach to all voters is that they would know what they were getting - either the maintenance of partition or the specific model. The UK's referendum experience of 2016 would be avoided. The change to the status quowould be clearly defined.

In the alternative, the Government of Ireland could propose a process that would occur after positive votes for unification. That process would lead to a constitutional convention, presumably elected by the single transferable vote, which would draft a new constitutional order to be put to the all-island citizenry for ratification. If the convention failed to agree a new constitution or voters refused to ratify the new constitution, then the existing Constitution of Ireland would be the default.

Proposing a process does not absolve the Government of Ireland of preparatory duties. It must specify the transitional arrangements, because a fast-paced transfer of sovereignty will be required to preserve political order. Specifying a model requires developing an operational plan to fulfil it. Specifying a process means elaborating how the convention would work, the transitional government, and being prepared for diverse outcomes form the convention. The model approach emphasises clarity at the potential cost of no unionist participation until they have lost in the Northern referendum. The process approach has the virtue of future inclusiveness but it would leave all future voters uncertain of the design of a united Ireland.