Professor David Phinnemore:

I will take the first few questions and comments about the Good Friday Agreement being ignored, the implementation of various aspects still to be realised and whether there is any optimism around. One thing that strikes me in British politics is, looking at the politicians in Westminster today, how many of them were around at the time the Good Friday Agreement was concluded. How many of them were actively involved in politics in the years leading up to the Good Friday Agreement? We have had a generational shift, and in some respects Brexit has forced a significant swathe of British politicians to re-engage with the Good Friday Agreement. They are being forced, as a consequence of Brexit, to look at what the Good Friday Agreement is, what it entails and what it means to people in Northern Ireland, on this island, on these islands.

If there is any note of optimism, it is that we are talking about it again, and not just those of us who live in the North. It is being discussed and debated more in London. There is no getting away from the statements that the British Government, particularly Theresa May, has made on fully upholding the Belfast Agreement. She obviously does not share the language of its past, but the sentiment is there. Those are not just statements issued in Parliament or on the steps of 10 Downing Street. They are part of communiqués at EU level, and the EU is very mindful of its desire to ensure that the Good Friday Agreement continues to be implemented.

In some senses, Brexit has given the Good Friday Agreement a far bigger profile. That said, it has also exposed the fact that there are significant elements that have not been addressed. The assumption underpinning the desire to support the Good Friday Agreement is that much of the potential of the agreement is still as yet unfulfilled. In trying to support the Agreement in the context of the Brexit process and future arrangements, the EU is trying to ensure that it is not only maintaining what has already been achieved, but also allowing the potential to be realised. It is as much forward-looking as it is backward-looking. If there is optimism, it is in that space.

A very important question was asked about the EU talking with one voice, and whether it is the strategy of some Brexiteers that at the 11th hour the EU will ditch Dublin and make the deal with London. Nine months ago, I think I would have been 50:50 on that question. I probably follow EU politics far more than is good for my health, and I note that the language of the EU has gotten stronger and stronger over time. I refer to European Council President Donald Tusk's statement when he was here: "Ireland first." Coming from the President of the European Council, who is meant to reflect the voices of the 27 in this, that is very important.

We also have to remember that the EU's position on Brexit and the Irish dimension is not simply a reflection of the 26 supporting a fellow member state that, through no fault of its own, finds itself in a position where it is likely to suffer economically and have to deal with a variety of political consequences. The EU has an interest in Northern Ireland and the peace process. Whether one agrees or not, it sees itself as having played a role, through the models of European integration inspiring some of the developments in the peace process or through the funding and other forms of assistance that it has given to Northern Ireland. It wants to be able to continue to say that this is its doing, an example of European integration. Whether one agrees with that or not does not matter. The fact is that is partly informing the EU's thinking.

The other dimension which I think we need to be aware of, which is coming through in some of the statements by Mr. Michel Barnier, is that this is not simply about the 26 supporting Ireland. This is about the 26 other member states supporting a small member state in the face of significant external challenges from a large soon-to-be-non-member state. In part, this is about sending signals to some of the other smaller member states around the EU who on their own could not withstand the challenges imposed by a neighbour, or would struggle to do so. There is a strong focus on Ireland, but there are other dimensions here. With those in mind, I think we can make a credible argument that in all likelihood, the 26 will remain behind Ireland. The EU's credibility, given the language it has issued around this, is arguably at stake. It is going to lose credibility in the eyes of a lot of its smaller member states if it does not support Ireland after all the statements that it has very publicly made. As such, I am very much beyond that 50:50 estimation now.