Mr. William Beausang:

Well, Deputy, it was always envisaged - and it was reflected in the papers leading up to the establishment of the DSG - that when a crisis hit, that obviously that would be managed at top level. So that's what transpired. I mean, the principals, you know, that's the Secretary General, the Governor, the Financial Regulator, were obviously operating under DSG rules in terms of the disclosure of information. But, I mean, the DSG was, in practice, never more than a ... a structure to facilitate information flow and information exchange between the authorities. And I think it was very, you know, it was effective in that respect in the regard that the Minister and Government were updated on the information on financial market conditions that the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator provided, which, as I mentioned earlier, might have been a difficulty if no structure was in place or, indeed, if there wasn't an MOU to deal with the ... the confidentiality issue, the stringent confidentiality issue ... stringent restrictions on information exchange that would otherwise operate. I suppose, as I've reflected in my witness statement, where it ... where it fell down was in that broader role that DSGs are intended to discharge around agreeing a kind of consensus view on how financial stability crises should be dealt with and the planning and the approach that should be adopted. And the scoping paper that we were talking about before the break was an attempt to try to create an agreed model or a greater level of consensus about how we would deal with the issues that were unfolding in the financial system. But, as I set out ... as I summarise and for the reasons I set out in the paper, that didn't come to pass. The ... and ultimately the DSG structure was overtaken by the speed of events.