Commissioner Kieran FitzGerald:

On 9 May this year we sent a report in accordance with section 80(5) of the Act to the Minister. This section allows us to so do when we believe it is appropriate because of the gravity of the matters that have come to our notice. The Minister has since laid the report before the Houses of the Oireachtas. We submitted the report because our findings in an investigation conducted in the public interest led us to have serious concerns regarding the implementation and management of informant handling procedures, both historic and current.

For reasons largely to do with the safety of persons, as outlined in our report, we are not in a position to discuss the details of the particular investigation. However, we make recommendations in our report and would like to refer to some of those for the committee. Before doing so, we would like to make it clear that we accept that informants are an established part of policing. However, complex issues arise regarding informants' motivations and the provision of any advantages or credit to them. That said, we have no issues with the proper use of informants.

What we found led us to conclude that there were serious deficiencies in the Garda Síochána management procedures regarding informant handling practices. We found poor record keeping and non-adherence to procedures. We found deficiencies in the implementation and management of the old system, which was replaced, following strong words from the Morris tribunal, by the current system, known as covert human intelligence sources, CHIS. What we found led us to believe that not all the deficiencies identified by the Morris tribunal were remedied. Our concerns are not historical; they relate to the present day. The deficiencies point to a culture wherein the formal informant handling systems could be bypassed or ignored. We can have a credible system, but the problem is that if a person chooses to bypass that system and run an informant "off the books", so to speak, there may be no way of ever even knowing that is going on.

The oversight systems in Ireland do not seem to take account of this. This is not a problem with the CHIS system. The Honourable Mr. Justice Thomas Smyth, now retired, reports to the Minister regarding the operation of the CHIS system. His findings have been positive. We have no reason to question Mr. Justice Smyth's findings, nor do we. We are saying that the oversight operated by Mr. Justice Smyth is not designed to address the possibility that informants might be run outside of the formal system. We are unaware of oversight that might monitor this.

Another major concern relates to the use of informants who may be participating in the criminal activity about which they are providing information, particularly as an individual providing the information could also be charged in regard to the alleged criminal activity. Absence of formal procedures for the management and use of such informants creates significant risks, as it is not possible, in particular, to place parameters upon the extent to which such individuals may be authorised to participate in criminality. We recommend that formal procedures be put in place to govern and guide the deployment and management of such informants, the extent to which gardaí should interact with the Director of Public Prosecutions in regard to such informants, including what information gardaí should bring to the DPP's attention and, in light of our findings of poor record-keeping, how such interactions should be recorded and filed.

We are concerned that the matters we have raised with the committee are having a detrimental impact on effective independent oversight of policing.