Micheál Martin (Cork South Central, Fianna Fail)
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Battlegroups are a key component of the capabilities that the EU can make available in support of UN-authorised crisis management operations. Within the EU Battlegroup concept, the purpose of the Battlegroup, as a rapid response capability, includes the role of acting as an initial entry force to stabilise a situation pending the deployment of a follow-on force, to support an established peace support operation which is running into difficulties, and to respond to humanitarian crises.   

Ireland has previously participated in the Nordic Battlegroups in 2008, 2011 and 2015, the Austro/German led EU Battlegroup 2012, the German-led EU Battlegroup in 2016, the UK led EU Battlegroup in 2016 and the German led Battlegroup in 2020. To date no Battlegroup has ever been deployed.  

Ireland’s full engagement in EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and in Battlegroups significantly enhances our capacity to influence the development of CSDP and of the Battlegroup concept.  Participation also demonstrates Ireland’s continuing commitment to the development of EU capabilities in the area of crisis management and contributes to our overall credibility within the Union.

The Defence Forces participation in EU Battlegroups also supports Ireland’s efforts in securing partners for UN blue hat operations due to the close civil and military relationships built through our participation.

Experience has shown that Ireland’s previous participation in EU Battlegroups has enhanced the Defence Forces’ ability to work with other nations in a multinational environment and has served to enhance the Defence Forces reputation as a provider of a credible military capability for CSDP peacekeeping operations under UN mandates. 

The Government has recently approved Ireland's participation in the next German-led EU Battlegroup, 2025, which will involve a two-year commitment from 1 January 2024.  The decision to participate in an EU Battlegroup does not presume any further decision in relation to participation in an actual Battlegroup operation.  Any such decision is subject to national decision-making procedures which, in Ireland’s case, means the “triple lock” of a UN Mandate and Dáil and Government approval.

Richard Bruton (Dublin Bay North, Fine Gael)
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52. To ask the Taoiseach and Minister for Defence how European defence policy has evolved since the start of the war in Ukraine. [5217/23]

Micheál Martin (Cork South Central, Fianna Fail)
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Since the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022, Ireland has been and remains resolute in solidarity with and support for Ukraine. Ireland continues to provide strong political and practical support for Ukraine and we continue to assert Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

At European level, significant time and effort over the past number of years has been invested in the development of the Strategic Compass, culminating in its approval in March of last year - shortly after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. 

This Strategic Compass sets out an analysis of the strategic environment and, in particular, the security and defence challenges faced by the EU, including emerging threats, the increasingly contested multi-polar world and the strategic implications for the EU and will help guide the way towards realising an ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU's security and defence policy by 2030. Member States have and continue to work on the implementation of the Strategic Compass, taking into account the additional challenges faced as a consequence of Russia's actions.

In light of the war in Ukraine, the European Peace Facility has been used to provide significant support to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The seventh tranche of EPF funding was recently agreed, which will increase Ireland's commitment to €77 million. Ireland's contributions through this facility are routed exclusively to the provision of non-lethal support. 

At its core, defence remains a national competence, something borne out by the differing responses and actions taken by EU Member States in the aftermath of the invasion. From decisions on defence investment and orientation taken across the Union to the choices made by Sweden and Finland in applying for NATO membership, Member States have assessed and taken action in ways which best fit their national needs.