Nicole Ryan (Sinn Fein)

I move amendment No. 1:

In page 6, lines 26 to 28, to delete all words from and including “a” in line 26 down to and including line 28 and substitute the following:

“the court may, on the application of any party to a defamation action in the High Court, or a question of fact or an issue arising in such an action, order that the action or any issue of fact in the action shall be tried without a jury if it is of opinion that such trial—

(a) will require any protracted examination of documents or accounts or any technical, scientific or local investigation which cannot conveniently be made with a jury,

(b) is for any special reason (to be mentioned in the order) unsuitable to be tried with a jury.

(2) The court may, on the application of any party to a defamation action in the High Court, order that in matters which may involve substantial damages—

(a) issues of fact shall be tried with a jury, and

(b) the quantum of any damages which may arise be adjudicated by the presiding judge.”.

My amendment seeks to restore some measure of balance and common sense to what has become a deeply flawed approach. The amendment is not just a technical fix. It is at the heart of protecting people's fundamental rights to vindicate their good name and to ensure that the process is fair, transparent and rooted in justice. The complete abolition of juries in High Court defamation cases as proposed by this legislation is not reform; it is actually rapture. It removes a pillar of our justice system that has stood the test of time. That pillar says when your reputation is on the line, it is your peers, not just the State, that should be trusted to decide the facts. What a defamation case is about is not numbers on a balance sheet, not abstract legal theory, but the value of your name, your character and your integrity. When they are called into question, people deserve the right to have their case heard not just by a judge but by a jury of their peers. If we remove juries, we are not just cutting costs; we are creating a democratic deficit. This is not just an abolition of choice. It is actually the abolition of a citizen's statutory right to seek a trial by jury. That right exists not just as a procedural option, but as a reflection of the fundamental democratic value that ordinary people share in the administration of justice. It is also a safeguard and a check on judicial overreach and potential bias. Without it, we risk judicial caprice where one voice becomes the only voice in cases that cut to the core of a person's identity. I ask the Minister directly: why now? Why is the Government creating this exception for defamation alone?Why is this the only area in law, uniquely among all torts, being carved out and stripped of its jury protection? This move has been justified on the grounds of efficiency and cost, but the rationale falls apart on closer inspection. If somebody brings a case for both defamation and malicious falsehood, they currently can be heard together in a single trial without the option of a jury but under this Bill this will no longer exist. We will force citizens to run two separate cases: one for defamation without a jury, and one for malicious falsehood with the potential of a jury. That does not reduce cost; it actually increases it, and it does not streamline justice; it splinters it. We wish to be clear this is not about savings; this is about centralising decision-making power and limiting public participation.

We already have the tools to address excessive awards. The Higgins case was pivotal in this regard. The judgment created a new framework for assessing damages and introduced judicial guidance that brought balance and predictability. Since the ruling, there have been at least four cases where the recommendations held and functioned as intended. Would it not be fair then to pause and fully review the post-Higgins landscape before making this permanent change?

This Bill amends the law as it was, not as it is. That is a serious error. We are legislating blind to the outcomes already in motion. There is also a question of fairness to those currently in the system. This law will not apply retrospectively so we will not even have a clear, measurable view of the impact for some time. This amendment is a middle ground. It lets the courts, not the Oireachtas, decide if a jury is appropriate in a given case. It mirrors the approach taken in the North and across other common law jurisdictions. It recommends traditional oversight while preserving democratic involvement. We do not need to burn the house down to fix the window.

I regret that we are here. With some flexibility and humility, this could have been a moment for unity and cross-party agreement and a powerful signal that we as legislators can protect freedom of expression and the right to a good name without diminishing either. Instead, we are being asked to be remembered in this House as a House that removed the voice of the people from one of the most human and reputationally damaging of trials. I urge the Government to support this amendment and let us legislate with principle, balance and respect for both the Judiciary and the public.