Gerard Craughwell (Independent) | Oireachtas source

The Minister is welcome to the House. I congratulate him on his elevation.

I believe there is now a requirement for a statutorily based overarching emergency management structure in Ireland. Storm Éowyn had a devastating impact throughout Ireland. It had a destructive impact on our critical national infrastructure, especially our electricity grid and water resources. Three weeks from deploying national and international repair crews, full recovery of the infrastructural resources had not been achieved. Citizens were left traumatised by the delays in returning to full capacity. Property and community facilities lay in ruins. Many with specific health issues, such as those requiring dialysis, were left in fear of their very lives as a result of the terrible storm.

Contrary to some comments, these devastating storms are fast becoming regular events in Ireland. Widespread floods and storm damage visit this country increasingly regularly.Many are questioning the State's strategic readiness and capacity in emergency management response. Their voices are getting louder. A complete review of emergency planning is long overdue. It is time we took a look under the bonnet of emergency management and examined exactly how Ireland's resilience will cope under stress tests.

Most colleagues will know that the three legs of the emergency management stool are An Garda Síochána, the Health Service Executive and local authorities. However, while each of these entities is statutorily based, there is no super-statutory body overseeing their response or outputs in the event of a civil emergency. As the Minister knows, the EU perspective on civil protection is that it is a subsidiarity issue. The EU provides co-ordination but does not legislate in this area. Legislation is a matter for each member state. Ireland is unique in being the only member state in the EU that does not have a legislative or statutory base for its emergency management structure and response. This lack of legislation puts the emergency structure and processes in Ireland at severe disadvantage. The language used in regard to Ireland's emergency management refers to guidance and recommendations. Nowhere is there provision to require or compel action. Primary responsibility rests with the Government of the day to protect our territory and citizens against disasters and to provide disaster management systems. Such systems should have sufficient sovereign, full-spectrum and immediate on-call capabilities that are identifiable and readily available. We need a process for a national notice to move surge capacity personnel and equipment reserves, along with additional third-line national contingency resilience on notice, to enable our country to cope adequately with disasters that can reasonably be expected and for which we must be prepared.

The Framework for Major Emergency Management has been in place since 2006, replacing the earlier arrangements put in place in 1984. The 2006 document sets out mechanisms for on-site co-ordination in the event of a major emergency, including at local and regional levels. However, it does not cover arrangements at national level. At best, it could be referred to as a regional framework. The 2006 framework is currently under review.

The strategic emergency planning guidance, which includes specific core points, was published by the Office of Emergency Planning in 2004 and was to be replaced by a national framework in 2015. The national framework is focused on providing strategic guidance and direction to Departments and agencies under its aegis. The national framework is not to be confused with the major emergency management framework. The lead Department concept, whereby responsibility for emergency management of identified risks is allocated to the most appropriate Department, is at the core of the strategic emergency planning guidance. Departments are not subordinate to each other. Implementing the decisions made by the lead Department, which may impact on another Department, can be very complex and sometimes unworkable. The designation of the most appropriate Department is not always the most advantageous. In organising a response, care must be taken not to intrude on matters appropriate to decision making by Ministers. In all circumstances, each Department must ensure its Minister is kept briefed on any emergency or crisis situation. Among the core points in the strategic emergency planning guidance is subsidiarity, whereby emergencies should be handled at the lowest possible level while at all times keeping the higher levels of authority aware of the situation, where appropriate.

As the Minister knows, in an emergency, a national emergency co-ordination group is created. The primary role of this group is to co-ordinate a whole-of-government response, as he noted in his opening statement. In certain circumstances, this group may have to act as a decision-making forum as opposed to merely co-ordinating Departments and agencies. In Ireland, decision making is not usual at this level, whereas in other jurisdictions, it is the norm. Clear policy decisions are issued, the intent of those decisions moves to specific actions at lower levels in the structure and, where necessary, detail is added. In the UK, for example, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 sets out the philosophy, principles, structures and regulatory duties in respect of the emergency response. It is a form of primary legislation allowing for the provision of secondary legislation to permit or require that a person or body is or is not to perform a duty under the relevant regulation.

Misconceptions exist regarding major emergency response in the context of civil protection. There is a difficult political dimension to a major emergency, which a government has to manage. Emergencies must be managed and that takes resources and political energy. Experience from other EU countries and the US shows that the concept of a single strong voice, an individual leader or central organisation taking charge is a fallacy. What is required is a clear decision-making mandate and a process to activate decisions quickly. There must be a process in place to ensure decisions are implemented once they are made. The various emergency services are the primary responders when disaster strikes. Secondary responders, such as power and telecommunication companies, other utilities such as water and gas providers, the Defence Forces and the Civil Defence, perform a vital role where the primary responders cannot provide a response on time.

There are gaps in the current major emergency response structure. Both research and the experience in other countries shows that the measures I will now outline give the best improvement in overall response but are only achieved when demanded by regulation. It is important to foster community resilience, which my colleague mentioned, by having in-date relevant contingency plans, providing training and creating a response structure. This needs to be the responsibility of a designated official in resilience forums based in a local geographic area. Co-ordination of the secondary response by utilities should be done on a regulatory basis. Critical infrastructure must be identified and classified appropriately for action. We need an effective and truthful lessons-learned process. The Minister mentioned he will look back at the response to the storm, which I hope is done. A lessons-learned process must be put in place in respect of exercises and responses to emergencies. This must be based on a no-blame functionality. We can look at this issue in honesty without looking for heads to roll or anything like that. We are looking to learn. There should be mandatory stress-testing simulation training and exercises in benign scenarios for managers and co-ordinators at senior level, to include political leaders. Desktop exercises are merely conversations. Response actions should be in place on receipt of, and in advance of, a specific warning. The provision of warnings and information to the public is insufficient. We need specific preparatory actions depending on the degree of anticipated impact. Gaining control of the media message is vital. This is particularly true of social media and is critical for confidence in community resilience. An ICT-based decision support and reporting system will give a faster and more effective response. Currently, relevant data is significantly out of date when it is assembled for analysis. Decision makers are often dependent on media reports, with key issues not being recognised.

Without a legislative base, there will be no requirement or incentive to join elements that already exist in Ireland for emergency management into an effective and efficient structure. A possible approach is to change the Office of Emergency Planning into an interdepartmental legal entity with a clear mandate and appropriate authority. This was what the Government envisaged when the Office of Emergency Planning was created in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001. Regardless of which Department any such statutory body might reside in, it would be mere window dressing without a Government commitment to annualised guaranteed funding to support such an overdue emergency management response policy. It is what developed democracies do to safeguard their citizens.

I congratulate the workers, including in local authorities, the ESB, the gas and water companies, etc., who put themselves in danger in going out to get their communities back online. Notwithstanding my call for a statutorily based emergency planning entity, I compliment the Government on the good job it did. The damage that was done was unprecedented and would take many countries by surprise. We do not need to be overly critical of what happened. A good job was done by all. However, I would like the Minister to look at putting things on a statutory basis.