Barry Ward (Fine Gael) | Oireachtas source

I will be brief. Section 69 essentially confers an unlimited jurisdiction, monetarily, on the District Court. It specifically states that where there is consent, that is, where the court is satisfied that an agreement has been reached between the parties and they have consented to proceedings being in the District Court, the family District Court, without limit as to monetary jurisdiction, can deal with the matter. My difficulty with this is that it presupposes that if the matter is agreed, it is, therefore, simple, but that is not necessarily the case. If we think of cases involving divorce, separation or cohabitation agreements, for example, consent can be arrived at but only after a very long and protracted period which means that the case will not start in the District Court and will probably start somewhere else. I acknowledge the benefit for certain parties who have agreed at the time they come to the steps of the court and have already decided exactly how things are going to go. There may well be a benefit to them but the reality is that in the vast majority of cases, that agreement comes later on in the day. It comes after the case has been initiated and therefore, it seems to me that there is little enough benefit to litigants in this provision in section 69 because they are going to have to go to another court in the first instance anyway.

There is another danger that arises. Again, just because a case is on consent does not mean it is straightforward. The consideration of orders within a case can take a considerable period of time so even where the parties have reached agreement, the judge dealing with the matter has to examine those agreements and be satisfied that they are right for the spouse and the children, potentially, if they are involved as well. It could still involve a very lengthy consideration, even in a consent case. It could still involve some very complex matters. An agreement reached by the parties may not necessarily hold and it could end up in a hearing in any event. There are just too many moving parts in some cases for it to be appropriate for them to start in the District Court.

The other difficulty that I foresee in relation to this is that the District Court would have very great difficulty in enforcing the orders that it makes if, subsequently, agreement or operation of the agreed parameters of a separation, divorce or cohabitation agreement were to break down. The additional issue is that the District Court is already chock-a-block. It is extremely busy, and the notion that a District Court judge will have time, even in a dedicated family District Court, to apply himself or herself to sometimes very lengthy considerations and then also deal with a busy list is problematic. That is why I am suggesting that the section be removed or opposed.