Alice-Mary Higgins (Independent) | Oireachtas source

This is a large grouping and it is good to have clarity on which amendments are being taken together so I can cover them all. Amendments Nos. 11, 16 and 29 attempt to delete references which the Minister inserted on Committee Stage to “other data-gathering devices”. We made very clear arguments against the inclusion of this wording on Committee Stage. The wording is far too open-ended and essentially permits the use of any surveillance technology to be employed on our roads without restriction. We have cautioned the Minister repeatedly against the use of such open-ended provisions in respect of data-gathering technology, particularly when that field is developing at an extraordinarily fast pace and where we are very often, as legislators, dealing with consequences or concerns in respect of technologies after they have been applied and after damage has been done. By including such broad provisions, we are leaving the door wide open for surveillance technologies which may not yet be understood, which may not yet be properly analysed, which may not have been properly risk-assessed and which may be deeply invasive, to be used without restriction. We are effectively opening Ireland up as a place to try things out in respect of surveillance technologies, which is not something we want for our country.

I am particularly concerned about this wording because it may permit the use of devices equipped with facial recognition technology. Of course, it may also permit the use of devices which are operating with artificial intelligence or according to other algorithmic identifications, with consequences and with data which may be gathered through that in an inappropriate way. It is worth looking to the UK to see how the unregulated and under-regulated use of such technology has played out there. A report launched by Big Brother Watch in the UK just this week found that 89% of live facial recognition matches on deployments by the Metropolitan Police and South West Police have been wrong since they introduced this technology, that is, an 89% inaccuracy level. This amounted to over 3,000 people wrongly identified by police facial recognition in the UK, with all of the knock-on consequences that has in terms of dealing with the breaches of rights this has created. Can we imagine what it would be like to be wrongly identified by a machine in respect of having committed a crime, and how distressing and traumatising this process can be, how difficult it will be to dispute the findings, and the potential consequences in personal life, in terms of employment and in public life, as well as the damage it does to the relationship between the public and those who are responsible for their protection?

This technology is not only deeply invasive but it is also deeply flawed and inaccurate. We raised points repeatedly in the previous debate about the issues with inbuilt racial biases that have been shown. Again, these are not speculative but known dangers in respect of these technologies. It should be noted that the activation of biases does not solely apply in respect of facial recognition technology but can apply in terms of other forms of technology which are based on stereotypes and assessments of risk that are algorithmically created. The Big Brother Watch report found that this technology, in particular facial recognition technology, discriminates against women and people of colour in particular. What is more worrying is that the technology is not reliable. It is deeply concerning that we risk playing so casually with people's freedom and with their civil liberties by legislating in such a casual and loose way around what are deeply consequential and deeply significant technologies.

I again urge the Minister to reconsider the wording in respect of “data-gathering devices”. If the Minister has certain technologies in mind, let him name them or, indeed, provide for a proper schedule and process whereby another technology may be added so there will be appropriate scrutiny on any new data-gathering device or data technology that may be added. With everything that we gather and use in this area, we need to examine and think about it very carefully. If the Minister does not wish to name or have a process or both whereby specific devices and technologies are identified and named, or added, even by subsequent legal process, let the Minister at the very least name the specific technologies which should not be permitted under the wording.

Amendments Nos. 34 and 40 would achieve this. Again, our preference is that we would have absolute clarity on exactly which kind of technologies and data-gathering devices would be used. However, if the Minister will not do that, the very minimum would be to give the assurance to the public and to us, as legislators, that certain kinds of technologies will not be added and used. Amendments Nos. 34 and 40 give the Minister the option for those exclusions. Some of the amendments are about inclusion and some are about exclusion. The core point is that we should not be putting a hostage to fortune in this legislation which allows not just the Minister but any future Government to almost use any "other data-gathering devices” in a manner that is potentially cavalier and, again, with consequences that are yet unknown.

I urge the Minister to take on board these amendments.If the Minister will not accept the amendments deleting this phrase, I ask that he at least consider amendments Nos. 34 and 40, to give us some protections and assurances regarding some of the technologies he will not allow to be used under that very wide definition.