Alice-Mary Higgins (Independent) | Oireachtas source

I move amendment No. 1:

In page 3, to delete lines 20 to 22 and substitute the following:

“ “(c) each subsequent successive period of 3 years, or earlier if the Minister deems appropriate, beginning on the commencement of section 2 of the Regulation of Lobbying (Amendment) Act 2023.”.”.

Amendment No. 1 seeks to remove the amendment of section 2 of the principal Act, which changes the review period from every three years to every five. What is the rationale for introducing this change into the principal Act? We know there are a lot of problems with this issue, including in respect of the resourcing adequacy of the powers of the commission. I am concerned that this delay of the review mechanism effectively means it has been expanded from something that can be fixed within a Government term to something which could not be fixed for an entire Government term. That is a concern. I do not see any rationale for letting these issues, if they do come to light, slide for longer than is necessary and issues have come to light in the past. It should be the case that the review mechanism remains the same, both to respond to the existing and known challenges and those which may emerge in the coming years. As I said, if we are having an issue whereby our regulation of lobbying legislation is not working appropriately, it should not be the case that this would not be addressed for the equivalent of an entire Government term.

Amendment No. 9 introduces a new subsection (14) into section 30, which would provide that within three years of the passing of this Act, the Minister would produce a report evaluating what the impact of the administrative sanctions has been, and crucially, whether the commission possesses the adequate resources and powers to implement this regime. We know, and it has been documented, that the Standards in Public Office Commission, SIPO, has in the past been told it needed further powers. It has spoken about needing further powers and we have seen situations, which in the public mind are areas that should be addressed, but in which SIPO has told us it did not have sufficient powers. Along with the powers issue comes the issue of resources. As resources are part of it, that is something I have added in. It is there in general within the regulatory mechanisms of the State, to ensure we do not have a situation whereby there is a lack of resources in dealing with, for example, a new pattern of lobbying behaviour that might emerge.

On a broader point, I also want to compliment Senator Boylan's amendment on fossil fuel lobbyists, which we will discuss in more detail later. There is urgency here in respect of the climate crisis. The lobbying of the fossil fuel industry over decades has resulted in serious delays to climate action when we are operating in a situation where every year matters. Again, this is something where SIPO would need the powers and resources. If we are in a situation whereby the new legislation put forward is not working effectively, we need to be able to correct course very rapidly because in some of the areas where lobbying may be having a significant impact, we have very limited time and a limited window within which to act appropriately.

Amendment No. 13 inserts a new section 24 into the Bill, which provides that the Minister shall, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, lay a report before the Houses of the Oireachtas outlining the potential for the introduction of legislative measures that might provide for a differential form of restrictions on post-term employment as a lobbyist for former office holders who seek to lobby on behalf of a sector for which they previously held a regulatory function.This amendment is important because, as we know, there are instances in which individuals who held significant regulatory roles as officeholders and were responsible for the stewardship of legislation relevant to particular sectors have, very soon after leaving those roles, moved to work as lobbyists for the exacts industries in respect of which they had a regulatory function. My colleagues and I in the Civil Engagement Group made a submission to the consultation that fed into this legislation in which we highlighted this issue and suggested a differential cooling-off period for officeholders who have regulatory functions in respect of specific industries. There is a difference between being an officeholder and having significant power in a specific area and being an ordinary Member of the Oireachtas. That needs to be recognised and I reserve the right to bring forward amendments in this regard on Report Stage. There is a significantly increased level of risk attached to a Secretary General or Minister, compared with ordinary Oireachtas Members, in terms of the impact of an inappropriate transition.

In our submission, we also proposed the introduction of a cooling-off period in respect of the trading of stocks and shares. High-ranking public officials should not be able, in the period immediately after they leave office, to use the information and insights they may have gained from having significant access to Cabinet decision-making and so forth. I reserve the right potentially to introduce amendments on Report Stage in respect of the trading of stocks and shares. A cooling-off period of one year in respect of any substantial stock trading should be enforced for all former taoisigh, Ministers, Ministers of State, senior advisers and Secretaries General.