Simon Coveney (Cork South Central, Fine Gael) | Oireachtas source

First of all, I am glad to be able to respond myself today to this debate and to have been here in person through the debate to listen to the various different arguments and perspectives.

As we all know, the security situation in Europe has changed fundamentally. Russia's illegal and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine, the decisions by Finland and Sweden to seek NATO membership, and the recommendations by the Commission on the Defence Forces have all brought security and defence issues to the fore in our national debate.

Last week's statement by the Russian foreign ministry spokesperson, which purposely misrepresented Ireland's military neutrality, has further highlighted the need to robustly defend our security and defence policy. The unjustified travel ban on 52 Irish politicians has highlighted clearly the extent of Russia's determination to spread disinformation to unsettle and isolate countries internationally.

The Government has made clear that Ireland's position since the beginning of Russia's further invasion of Ukraine in February is focused on upholding international law and supporting Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. We have been steadfast in our international response, which has been clearly situated within our existing policy of military neutrality.

That is why today’s debate is important. We need to be really clear on what Ireland's policy of military neutrality does, and does not, mean.

Every independent state has the right to choose its own foreign policy and to ensure the security and defence of its territory. In Ireland's case, our policy of military neutrality as practised by successive Governments over many decades means Ireland does not participate in military alliances or common or mutual defence arrangements. The Government has no plans to alter this policy.

The Senators supporting the motion before us today will be aware that there are already several provisions in the Constitution that underpin Ireland's foreign and security policy. In particular, Article 29 establishes the framework within which Ireland conducts its international relations. For example, Article 29.1 reads, "Ireland affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation amongst nations founded on international justice and morality." Article 29.2 confirms that Ireland adheres to the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes. An additional element was added in the context of ratification of the Lisbon treaty, as some in this House will recall. The amendment of Article 29 on that basis created a requirement to hold a referendum on participation in any potential future military alliance.

In addition to the constitutional provisions in place, successive Governments have reaffirmed their commitment to our policy of military neutrality. Importantly, today's motion does not call for a change in our approach to neutrality. Instead, it notes the many ways our policy of neutrality has informed our active approach towards peace support operations and crisis management, and our contributions to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. It is in this context that today's motion calls on the Government to properly fund Ireland's Army, Air Corps, Naval Service and cyber capacity in order that we can continue to make this significant contribution internationally. I can say with confidence that this is exactly what we are doing.

Following the publication of the report of the independent Commission on the Defence Forces earlier this year, the Government has approved a move, over a six-year period, to a level of Defence Forces' capability equivalent to level of ambition 2, as set out in the report, which is exactly what the commission recommends.

This will entail multi-annual funding increases commencing next year and is already provided for in the 2023 Estimates for my Department, to reach a defence budget equivalent to €1.5 billion in January 2022 value, index-linked up to 2028. That, effectively, means we will be spending approximately €2 billion by that time. This will amount to more than a 50% increase in defence funding since the establishment of the independent commission in 2020.

Moreover, we will incrementally increase personnel numbers by some 2,000 over and above the current establishment of 9,500. In reality, as Senators will be aware, that means an addition of approximately 3,000 extra Permanent Defence Force personnel over a six-year period, as well as, by the way, a similar number of extra personnel within the Reserve in that period.This is about 6,000 extra Defence Force personnel over a six-year period. It is not easily achieved, just in case anyone believes we are not ambitious in respect of resourcing and increasing capacity. I do not underestimate the challenge in achieving this objective, but I will shortly outline several concrete initiatives we have put in place to address issues around recruitment and retention. Given the criticism I have heard from some this evening, it is worth saying that other parties, in terms of the last budget, have proposed a fraction of the increase in funding the Government is delivering next year. I refer to the main Opposition party in particular. I heard what was said by the Senator, but the reality is that in Sinn Féin's alternative budget it was proposing to spend an extra €10 million on defence next year, plus an extra €15 million on top of that in terms of pay, compared to the extra €114 million we will spend in one year. Let us, therefore, have an honest discussion in terms of prioritisation and capacity delivery within the Defence Forces. Not only are we committing to increased spending of almost €115 million next year, but we are committing to spending multiples of this figure over the next six years.

Before addressing the particular issue at hand, it is worth recalling that in 2023 the total allocation for the Defence Vote group is €1.174 billion, which is an overall increase of €67 million on 2022. When we add the €47 million or so that is going to be attached to the cost of Building Momentum, this is where we get the figure I have quoted of about €114 million next year. This increase reflects a pattern of consistent increases in defence expenditure allocations over the last number of years, with the 2023 gross Vote 36 Defence allocation of €893 million, some €186 million, 26%, greater than the corresponding 2018 figure. In addition, and in line with this Government’s commitment to ensure the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission on the Defence Forces, the Defence capital allocation has also increased significantly, by €35 million in one year, to €176 million for 2023. This allocation not only represents the single biggest annual capital investment ever provided to Defence, but also represents an increase of €99 million, or 129%, on 2018.

As with any debate, it is important that it is informed by facts and these facts demonstrate the Government’s commitment to adequately fund our Defence Forces’ capabilities. Are we where we need to be? No, we are not. Are we, however, committed to getting there? We absolutely are, and we are putting our money where our policy dictates. Moreover, the increased resourcing over recent years has enabled the Defence Forces to make a significant contribution to domestic security, to provide a broad range of supports to the civil authorities and to undertake critically important emergency aeromedical support and fishery protection roles. The Defence Forces also contribute significantly to international peace and security efforts by providing support to the UN and the EU. I was very much involved in trying to explore the opportunity regarding whether the Air Corps could take over search and rescue operations in the years to come. It did not work out because we simply did not have the capacity to deliver what was needed in the timeframe we had available to us. This is the truth. I hope we will have the capacity to do this in future tenders in the context of this role. Let us not, though, talk about these important issues without having the facts available to us. I am proud to say that the record of our Defence Forces' continuous service, more than 60 years, is the longest of any UN member state.

I mentioned a moment ago that I would outline measures we have been putting in place to address issues around recruitment and retention. I take the point made in this context. As with the issue of capability, however, it is important that we deal in facts and not sound bites so we can plan policy on this basis. With its approval of the Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces, the Government is committed to a range of actions, including a range of measures that will improve pay and conditions and bolster the attractiveness of a career in the Defence Forces. The implementation of two of the pay-related recommendations of the commission will result in the pay rates, to include the military service allowance, for a private three star or able seaman, in their first three years of service, starting at €36,418 in year 1, increasing to €37,788 in year 2 and reaching €39,050 in year 3. I regard these rates of pay as competitive. Even in a tight labour market, they compare favourably with other entry-level pay rates across the public service. This is simply a fact. This is important because the issues around recruitment and retention are far from confined to the Defence Forces, even within the public service. Let us consider the challenges we face in An Garda Síochána now. The personnel of the Defence Forces are paid increases in pay and allowances in line with public sector pay agreements. The recently agreed extension to Building Momentum provides for further increases in pay and allowances to all public servants, including members of the Defence Forces. This agreement provides for a 6.5% increase over 2022 and 2023.

While there is a continued perception that the personnel of the Defence Forces are among the lowest paid cohort in the public service, the reality is that jobs differ greatly across the public service, so it is difficult to make direct comparisons. I accept this point. The structure of the Permanent Defence Force differs significantly from that of other organisations with higher numbers, in relative terms, at entry-level ranks or in training. Where ranks and specialties are compared with comparable grades across the public sector, there is little difference in truth.

Turning now to the issue of the appointment of a Minister for Defence, there is little that I can say about the proposal to have a Minister for Defence appointed with no additional ministerial responsibilities. There is, as Senators will be aware, a constitutional limit on the number of Ministers that can be appointed and that currently there are more Departments of State than there are Ministers who can be appointed under the Constitution. It is, therefore, a matter for decision by a Taoiseach to allocate ministerial portfolios upon the formation of a Government.

Given the significant national interest in this conversation, it is clear that there is a need for fresh debate about our approach to security and defence. To an extent, part of this conversation has already begun through the work of the Commission on the Defence Forces. However, inserting provisions now into the Constitution on military neutrality, without allowing for considered, informed discussion, closes off that conversation before it can properly begin. The Government has recognised the need for further reflection and debate on security and defence issues in Ireland, potentially through a citizens’ assembly or some other framework that people will be happy with. While I appreciate the opportunity to debate these matters today, it is important that these conversations are allowed to take place in an open and evidence-based way and over an appropriate time.

Turning to the triple lock, what I have said in this regard, and I have been very upfront about it in committees and in the Dáil, as well as in conversations with other parties' spokespeople, etc., is that we should be open to ensuring we can make decisions consistent with our value system, with our foreign policy and with us continuing to play a role internationally in support of peace and post-conflict situations in many countries. It is simply a fact that if part of the decision-making process around whether we can send the personnel of the Defence Forces abroad is a UN Security mandate, then we could, potentially, be prevented from sending Irish peacekeepers to parts of the world that could benefit significantly from such intervention by a veto being used in the Security Council.

This is not about one member of the Security Council. In recent months, however, we have seen examples of where this might have been a frustration. Let us take, for example, the recent agreement in the Security Council to extend the mandate of Operation Althea operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is an EU-led mission but with a UN mandate. There was an expectation that this mandate would not be renewed. As it happens, Ireland was the penholder in that situation and managed to get agreement on it. If that proposal had not been agreed, however, are we seriously saying that our Parliament and Government could not make a decision to be a part of a hugely important mission like this, one charged with reinforcing stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because one member of the P5 member states of the UN does not like it and decides to veto the resolution?Is that a sensible position for us to be in?

I accept the triple lock has served a useful purpose. It has provided a lot of reassurance that Irish neutrality is being protected in the context of decision making in respect of where and whether to send Irish troops abroad. The world has changed, however. Having been on the Security Council for the past two years, I know the tension within it is such that it is perfectly reasonable to expect that mandates around peacekeeping missions that we want to be part of may not be renewed, for whatever reason linked to tension and interest in the context of the relationship between the five permanent members of the Security Council. Should we restrict ourselves to that potential veto preventing Ireland making a decision that we believe to be the right one? What I am saying to the House is the same as what I have said to the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. I would like to explore with other political parties in government and in opposition how we could potentially evolve our triple lock system to ensure the Government and the Parliament - the Dáil and the Seanad - have a say, but also to explore other mechanisms that could ensure we are acting in a way that is consistent with the UN charter or that can give the public reassurance that we are acting and making interventions that are consistent with and appropriate to the value system that is at the centre of Irish foreign policy. Let us be open to real debate based on the facts and the political reality on the ground, rather than a historical attachment to the triple lock because we associate it with Irish neutrality. The reality is that it could prevent us making interventions we may wish to make in future and which this House may support.

We need to be careful about being too judgmental of other countries and their choices in respect of whether they wish to be part of NATO. I do not believe Ireland should join NATO but I can understand why Finland and Sweden would decide to join it or why Baltic states in the EU believe they have to be part of NATO for their self-protection. This is not about wanting to go to war to advance a NATO agenda; it is about self-defence and a fear in terms of their own security situation. That is why they are part of NATO. It is a defence alliance. It is often spoken of in this House and the Lower House as if it is some kind of expansive and aggressive agenda in the world today. I know many Swedish and Finnish politicians who had been making a case against NATO membership for many years but now believe they have no alternative in the context of protecting their countries. If Ireland was geographically located where Finland is, would we be having the same conversations in respect of NATO that we have here, given the privilege we have to be surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean, with the United Kingdom on one side and the US on the other in terms of natural protections? We have designed our foreign policy on the basis of where we are geographically in the world and what works for us, which is a focus on disarmament, international law, human rights law.

I refer to what Ireland has achieved on the Security Council in the past two years. In recent days, we managed to get agreement to a declaration supported by 82 countries around the world to limit the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. That is the kind of thing Ireland does very effectively on the international stage, but we also need to have credibility in terms of our own security. We should not be afraid to speak about partnerships with other countries in the EU. We should be able to do so without being fearful of people questioning Irish neutrality, which is not what it is about. It is about a practical and sensible approach to ensuring Ireland can protect its sovereignty, make a contribution in other parts of the world in the context of peacekeeping and peace enforcement and make a credible contribution towards the security of the European Union, on the back of which we thrive. I do not wish to divide the House on the motion, and I am not going to do so, but it is important the Government has an opportunity to express its concerns in respect of elements of the motion.