Gerard Craughwell (Independent) | Oireachtas source

The Minister of State is welcome to the House for this, the third debate I have requested on the procurement process for the next SAR contract. I acknowledge that in the letter of 4 August, signed by the Minister of State and the Minister for Transport, Deputy Eamon Ryan, it is stated that, as Ministers, they are somewhat removed from the day-to-day execution of procurement processes and that they have engaged with their officials to understand and to reply to the issues I have been raising.Is the Minister of State happy to be subservient to her officials in supporting them in blocking Oireachtas oversight of this procurement? Does she have regard to how taxpayers' money is spent? Is she even the slightest bit concerned that her officials are proceeding with the procurement of Ireland's next SAR service without the in-house aviation expertise the air accident investigation unit, AAIU, recommended following the fatal crash of R116? Is she aware that the UK has just signed a SAR contract for 18 helicopters for 12 bases, including fixed wing and drone support, for a total of £1.6 billion for ten years, whereas her Department's tender currently stands to cost us €1 billion for five helicopters for four bases, and possibly €1.5 billion by the time the contract is signed?

Is she the slightest bit concerned that before the contract is awarded plans are being put in place to circumvent the AAIU recommendation concerning new flight time limitations imposed by the Irish Aviation Authority on SAR operators? The letter of 4 August states that the new regulatory framework underpinning this also allows for any operator, new or existing, to apply for a variation from the maximum flight duty period of 12 hours, which would allow for a full 24-hour crew roster, with the approval of the IAA, subject to the development of fatigue risk management systems by the operator concerned. Has her Department learned nothing from the reckless management of SAR which cost four lives? Is she aware that the UK fleet includes six AW139 helicopters which her advisers rejected without one scrap of empirical evidence to support their opinion? Can she tell the Irish public what experience the advisers her Department is using have in SAR? According to my information, they are not, and never have been, SAR pilots and they are not SAR crew?

Let me turn to the business case and Frazer-Nash. The letter of 4 August dismisses any potential conflict of interest involving Babcock's defence and security group, which may be bidding for Department's Coast Guard SAR contract. It is my understanding that neither she nor the Cabinet were made aware that all companies within the Babcock International Group, including Frazer-Nash, use the same secretariat or that all Babcock companies, including Frazer-Nash, use the same address. Was she or the Cabinet made aware that the directors of Frazer-Nash held directorships in Babcock companies? I have the names here but I will not read them out. One of the directors, however, has 59 directorships in Babcock as well as Frazer-Nash. Another director has 13 directorships in Babcock companies as well as Frazer-Nash, a third has eight directorships in Babcock companies has well as Frazer-Nash, a fourth has two as well as Frazer-Nash, while the final director has one. All five directors of Frazer-Nash are, or were at the time, in some way related to Babcock. Am I correct in my belief that the initial business case when presented to Cabinet did not highlight the connection between Babcock and Frazer-Nash? Were any precautions notified to the Cabinet in the document when it approved it? If not, for what reason was that left out?

I now turn to the 415-page submission of the Air Corps. The letter of 4 August states that the Air Corps provided its own costings in respect of its hybrid option. It was noted at the time that the Air Corps proposal was reliant on the procurement of at least two additional aircraft. How were a possible two additional aircraft costed? How does one cost that in a business case? Was it two, three or four aircraft? How many aircraft was the Air Corps supposed to be charged to have? The August letter states that the AW139 helicopter type originally proposed by the Air Corps did not meet the requirements of the Coast Guard in terms of payload range and interoperability. I have seen the three-page document produced by Aerossurance Limited which criticises the 415-page Air Corps proposal. Not one scrap of empirical evidence is provided. Nothing is provided to support its view. Can the Minister of State explain how the aircraft that will form one third of the new UK fleet and is in use all over the world in SAR roles did not meet the Irish requirements? What do we know that the rest of the world does not know? Was the submission from Mountain Rescue Ireland in which it stated that it had difficulty with heavy helicopters being unable to land on soft ground in the mountains, as well as the risk in cliff rescue situations of casualties being blown off the cliff due to the downdraft of these heavy helicopters, taken into consideration? I invite her to look at the video made by CHC which refers to the difficulties caused by downdraft and the damage it can do in a rescue situation. Was the question of operating costs considered? It is clear that the AW139 is a much cheaper helicopter to operate than an S-92.

The letter of 4 August states that discussions are ongoing with the Air Corps on SAR. When were the most recent meetings, phone calls, letters or emails on this matter? Does the Minister of State support the Secretary General of her Department when he makes the most outrageous and possibly libellous allegation against the members of the Oireachtas joint committee? He stated in a letter that another source of risk is the possibility that a member of the committee may have a relationship with one of the participants in the competition and might put questions to the Department-----