Alice-Mary Higgins (Independent) | Oireachtas source

I have a couple of concerns. I hope they can be addressed and reflected. We are talking about a combination of the three. My primary concern regards the exchange of Prüm data with the UK. There are concerns when we look at things like the fall of the privacy shield. The UK is effectively a third country in terms of EU data in certain circumstances. There are concerns about how data may be treated. The goal is to be able to exchange data in as many ways as possible and, in terms of crime investigation, that is important. However, Chris Jones, EU director at the Home Office, has spoken about how standards may evolve and states the UK will "have a choice as to whether or not to move its standards to meet ... requirements under the Prüm system. There is no compulsory requirement for us to align with the EU Prüm system." It is similar in terms of the UK parliamentary committee. They are clear from the UK perspective that they regard as a moveable piece the extent to which they need to align with EU standards on addressing this data. There was an evaluatory visit in November 2021 by the EU evaluation team on DNA profiles and dactyloscopic data. Such information falls under the GDPR and into the special categories of personal information, so it is particularly sensitive.

There are concerning elements in UK law over the past two years which need to be thought through and addressed. Specifically, there is the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act, which was passed very rapidly at the end of 2020 and which gives impunity to covert human intelligence agents in the UK to commit any crimes. That means impunity for any crimes committed by those working as human intelligence agents for the UK state. Many people in civil society raised concerns. Ireland should have had significant concerns because it was indirectly affected by the culture of impunity in human intelligence areas in the past in the UK, with the spy cops scandal. That scandal concerned a situation where, over three decades, undercover officers created false personas and, in some cases, deceived people into sexual or political relationships, in one case fathering a child with somebody under a false identity. They would effectively have had a form of impunity and, instead of addressing this, it is being cemented into law by the covert human intelligence sources Act. Ireland was affected by that because some of those agents operated in the Irish State.

In that context, will the Minister of State address two matters? It is almost a double protection. First, will covert human intelligence operatives in the UK be immune? Will they be subject to this? Will their DNA and so forth be exchanged if it is sought in relation to crimes they commit? Second, will these intelligence operatives have access to DNA or other sensitive information through this mechanism of exchange, which they can use with impunity and without regard for the normal caveats of law that anybody, and certainly servants of the state, should be subject to? It is a specific but important issue. I would like if it had been better addressed in the EU scrutiny of this matter.

I have heard concerns from people who contacted me. We have all seen the phenomenon whereby those who are wealthy become insolvent and are wealthy again a few years later, with a number of creditors, including sometimes employees and labour creditors, who are vulnerable.How can we ensure that this new exchange concerning insolvency practice will not contribute to insolvency shopping, whereby people choose to go bankrupt or seek insolvency in certain circumstances. In Ireland, we have some protections for labour creditors, namely, the employees of someone who becomes insolvent. We must ensure their rights do not become diminished through any form of insolvency shopping.