Gerard Craughwell (Independent) | Oireachtas source

I welcome the Minister of State to the House. In his speech to the Dáil last evening, the Minister, Deputy Ryan, should have clearly and unambiguously informed the House that there is no Act of the Oireachtas on the Statue Book giving legal responsibility for Irish SAR to the Irish Aviation Authority. I will say that again: today, as I speak, the IAA is not legally responsible for Irish SAR. This is a jaw-dropping scandal of monumental proportions. It is distressing to have to address this House on the tragic loss of Rescue 116 and her four valiant crew members - Dara Fitzpatrick, Mark Duffy, Ciarán Smith and Paul Ormsby - at Blackrock Island in 2017. I offer my condolences to their families and call on those close to them to ensure they get legal advice for whichever jurisdiction they deem best.

It is a tragedy, but one that should have been avoided long before the helicopter took to the sky. The litany of abysmal failures by Ministers and senior civil servants at the Department of Transport, the Irish Coast Guard, the Irish Aviation Authority and, most especially, the operator CHC Ireland DAC, have had grave and unacceptable ramifications.Those who held a ministerial brief in respect of or had a management role in these organisations, especially since 2010, need to reflect honestly on their respective records.

CHC must not be allowed to tender for any part of the next SAR contract. The current procurement process must be halted in light of the report, and we must have some part of the next contract provided by our sovereign service, the Irish Air Corps. The Department of Transport has failed and, incredibly, continues this very day to fail to legislate and legally assign responsibility for SAR regulation and operational safety to the appropriate Irish entity, namely, the IAA. The group that produced the 2010 report on constructing a future Irish airborne SAR service, chaired by the then head of the Irish Coast Guard, Mr. Chris Reynolds, sensibly recommended that the IAA legally oversee SAR safety and operations. In 2014, the IAA, acting on its own initiative, published a notice regarding SAR safety and operations; however, the notice had no legal import as the Department of Transport had failed to legislate to give legal responsibility for SAR oversight to the IAA. Eleven years later, and with four lives lost, the Department has still not given legal responsibility to the IAA. That is astonishing, reckless and barely believable.

The Air Navigation and Transport Bill that is currently before the Oireachtas will, if passed, finally give legal certainty to the IAA in respect of overseeing SAR operations. Incredibly, no Opposition amendments to the Bill will be accepted by the Government. These are amendments recommended by the pilots.

Ireland is a founding member of the UN International Civil Aviation Organization. For many years, Ireland has led innovations in civil aviation, with the development of the aircraft-leasing sector and the low-cost airline industry, thereby democratising air travel for all. The R116 report casts a dark shadow over these achievements, highlighting a catalogue of errors, omissions, faulty communications procedures, substandard navigation route designs, the use of maps that are not fit for the purpose for which they are being used and a continuing lacuna in the law, meaning there is no entity with legal oversight for Irish SAR services.

The R116 disaster was preventable and SAR crews, their families and the citizens of Ireland have been failed. R116 should not have been out on the ill-fated night, tasked with providing top-cover air communications. These are most effectively provided by fixed-wing aircraft because of their greater communication range. At the time of the disaster, reckless Government policy had resulted in the inability of the Air Corps to provide fixed-wing top cover on a 24-7 basis due to a pilot shortage. The Air Corps was then officially only able to provide fixed-wing top cover on an as-available basis. In 2015 and 2016, respectively, boards convened by the Department of Defence recommended a retention policy with financial incentives for Air Corps pilots to remain in State service. The reports were left gathering dust and the Air Corps pilot shortage continued. Since the R116 tragedy, a proper pilot retention policy was put in place in the Air Corps. It has been a success but still has some way to go. Let us join the dots. If in 2015 and 2016 boards’ recommendations on Air Corps pilot retention had been acted upon, we would have had 24-7 fixed-wing capability. Most probably, it would have been in place in 2017 and R116 would not have had to take on its fateful mission.

Ireland is one of only two European countries that have privatised the SAR service. The other is the UK. Unlike Ireland, however, the UK has substantial sovereign SAR capability in both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft via the Royal Air Force. Ireland has failed to resource properly its Air Corps with aircraft and personnel to retain appropriate sovereign capability. All responsible states retain sovereign SAR capability in case of the loss of a privatised SAR service due to industrial action and in the unlikely event that an entire fleet of aircraft will be grounded for technical reasons.

Ireland has recklessly allowed its Air Corps to be under-resourced in terms of aircraft and crews despite countless warnings about this folly. In 2011, the £6 billion sterling UK SAR bidding process was halted when a scandal broke. An inquiry during the bidding process revealed that there was widespread insider trading of a kind. An official in the Ministry was leaking information on the bidding to one company. That company was CHC, which was then the preferred bidder in the UK but which was ultimately removed from the process. Incredibly, almost at the same time, CHC was fortunate to find a home for its aircraft, having been awarded a ten-year contract in Irish SAR by the Irish Department of Transport for the Irish Coast Guard. With the rich financial pickings, not alone was CHC rewarded with a ten-year contract for the SAR service but it could extend that contract for up to a further three years, leading to an estimated cost of some €1 billion.

Now we come to the real nub of the problem: neither the Department of Transport nor the Irish Coast Guard has any aviation expertise. To overcome the deficit, what do they do? They contract in UK-based aviation SAR consultants. A number of examples will shock even those who are not already shocked. After the R116 tragedy, and after the draft final report was published, a review body was set up by the Department and a UK expert was appointed to it. Guess what: within a short period, that expert had to resign because of an identified conflict of interest. Who vetted his appointment?

Another example from after the R116 tragedy concerns where the Department of Transport awarded a tender to another UK-based company, Aerossurance, to advise on aviation compliance. It was a one-man operation that, when contracted by the Department, had a turnover in the previous year of £40,000 sterling and only one continuing contract. Most incredibly, after the R116 tragedy, the Department decided to recruit an aviation manager for the Irish Coast Guard. This competition had an application closing date of Thursday, 3 December 2020, one year ago. Guess what: the position remains unfilled to this day.

The pre-procurement process for the next ten-year SAR contract had been ongoing for some time. The Department contracted KPMG to produce a business case for the proposed contract. Astonishingly, KPMG had no suitable internal aviation expertise in this space. Therefore, what did it do? It contracted a UK-based company called Frazer-Nash to be its aviation adviser. Guess what: Frazer-Nash, at the time of the contract, was owned by an aviation company called Babcock, a likely bidder for the Irish upcoming ten-year contract. Did Frazer-Nash and KPMG recommend, in the business case, the Department of Transport and the Irish Coast Guard for the next SAR contract? Did they recommend that the Air Corps be excluded from any part of the helicopter element of the next SAR contract — even the east coast helicopter SAR service, which the Air Corps can easily deliver with State-owned assets and State-paid crews from Baldonnel? After all, why would Frazer-Nash and KPMG not make such a recommendation? I am referring to more gravy for the boys and girls in the UK-based aviation companies and to milking the Irish Exchequer with substandard equipment and outputs this past ten years. This is continuing. Awarding Irish SAR delivery solely to the UK-based clubby boys I have just referred to, the private operators, continues the gravy train for them and degrades sovereign Air Corps capability. The business case produced by KPMG and Frazer-Nash for the Department has not been published, for reasons that are entirely spurious and suspicious. In the public interest, it must be published before any formal tendering process for the next ten-year contract begins.

The Irish Coast Guard has recently come to further unwelcome attention in reports by the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Committee of Public Accounts. The real culprit is not the Coast Guard; it is the Department of Transport itself. First, it was revealed that the State paid €7.5 million in 2013 to retrofit the cockpits of CHC’s helicopters to make them night-vision-goggle compatible. In addition, the State bought night-vision goggles and ancillary night-vision equipment, along with providing a budget for the conversion and training of CHC pilots for night-vision operation. The training has not yet been completed; however, this all started back in 2013. To date, the training has not been completed.

In the AAIU report on R116, frequent reference is made to Captain Dara Fitzpatrick, her co-pilot, Captain Mark Duffy, and other pilots commenting on the poor state of cockpit lighting in the Sikorsky S-92 CHC helicopters. Who carried out the retrofitting of the Sikorsky S-92 cockpits paid for by the State? Could the retrofitting of the cockpits explain the poor lighting? Has this been examined? Is there a requirement for a switch in the cockpit that can turn night-vision capability on and off? Who certifies the equipment as operational?Delivery of SAR in Ireland solely by private operators needs to end for sound operational reasons. An east coast SAR service and fixed-wing top cover must be provided by the sovereign Irish State Air Corps. We need to go back and rethink everything about the current process. It is deeply flawed.