Alice-Mary Higgins (Independent) | Oireachtas source

There is a fundamental misapprehension here and there is a danger of misleading people. I commend Deputies Wallace and Clare Daly on their work in respect of the amendments. The amendments were put forward in response to the issues of coercive consent and the importance of people being able to use another way when they choose to have their information used for verification.

One amendment refers to the public services card and a person's access to the database where the public service identity and information dataset is currently compiled. It proposes that this should not be the exclusive basis by which a person can verify his or her identity. There is an onus on persons to verify their identity and in many of our services, such as the application for a driver's licence since the changes were made in respect of certain grants by the Minister for Transport, Tourism and Sport, Deputy Ross, people verify their identity to the satisfaction of the relevant authority or Minister without reference to the public service identity dataset. Government has a goal to ensure that the public service identity dataset becomes the main, and perhaps the exclusive, reference for this but, at the moment, there are other options in a number of areas. The situation is described as catastrophic by the Minister but it already exists.We have a number of situations in which persons are accessing services and they have one option. This is not true for every case because not all public bodies are specified bodies. Not all public bodies or Departments are currently covered by the Social Welfare Consolidation Act and have access to the public service identity dataset. Persons are accessing services and their identity has been verified possibly by the public services card or by another means, and it only has to be by one other means. For example, the Government is very attached to the SAFE 2 mechanism of identity verification, which was invented by it and the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform. If that is deemed satisfactory then there is nothing to stop legislation saying, "by public service identity ... by reference to ... by access". If I am an official who wishes to verify somebody's identity to my satisfaction or if a Minister wishes to verify somebody's identity to his or her satisfaction, I may have reference to and access the public service identity dataset or I may, for example, accept a passport or another form of verification. I may ask for bills or I may even require that the person would go through a full SAFE 2 identification process on a case-by-case basis. Few people will take that option but there is nothing to preclude such an option.

I hate to challenge the Attorney General directly. However, the reading, as determined by the Attorney General is wrong in terms of GDPR because the wording suggests that a person's name and date of birth are information that belongs to the public service identity dataset. My name, address and date of birth may well be in a dataset or on a database that can be accessed but the database does not own that information because one of the fundamental core principles of GDPR, which takes precedence - and the Minister of State has acknowledged that the GDPR takes precedence in this case - is the principle that a person's information is his or her information. If it was the case that we could not look for somebody's name, address or date of birth other than by accessing this dataset, I could not sign up for a gym membership or get a video rental card because my name is, theoretically, not something that can be verified separately; it is something that can only belong to this dataset. That is a chilling argument and is why I must push back on it as an argument. The idea that each of those elements of information, which are personal to the individual, are somehow intrinsically linked to, and belong to, this dataset does not stand up and it is a concern. I met the Minister of State's officials and that is why I tabled a number of amendments. It is disappointing to see some of my amendments rolled back but I accept, in good faith, that there was an attempt to work with them and with the principles that we agreed on. However, this particular argument does not stand up and it is a concern.

I am sure that 99.9% of people are happy to have their information stored on the public service identity dataset and to have that be a speedy and easy means by which their identity is verified. However, a number of people are concerned about the matter. Their concerns are reasonable because the DPC has concerns in respect of how the dataset is accessed and used. We do not know the detail of what the resolution of those concerns have been because the Government has declined to publish, as has the commissioner, the reports of her section 10 inquiry into the public services cards and public service identity. There is a big question mark over the mechanism by which people authenticate their identity and many unknown concerns in respect of data protection. The amendments in the Dáil, particularly amendment No. 6 because it is so reasonably worded, simply ask that this mechanism not be the only and exclusive mechanism. Let us remember that persons may be on the dataset due to being in receipt of social welfare services, for example. The amendments mean that even if the dataset is there that an official accessing it - this does not undermine the existence of the dataset - might not be the exclusive method for verification. I am confident that the provision does not prevent somebody accessing information such as birth certificates, proof of address, utility bills, date of birth or any of that other information. An official may choose to access other information pertinent to the person who seeks a service without logging into and accessing this particular dataset. The provision is clear and, therefore, I cannot support the changes in that regard.