Simon Coveney (Cork South Central, Fine Gael) | Oireachtas source

It is always dangerous giving me 20 minutes, particularly on this topic where I could stay for the night. I am glad to have the opportunity to speak without reading to try to address some of the issues that have been raised.

It is worth saying that the Irish position on the choice of our closest neighbour is one of regret and also a recognition of what I have often described as a "lose, lose, lose" situation. In time, this decision will be seen to have damaged the UK's standing in the world and may well have damaged the British economy, although the UK is big enough and strong enough to survive it.

It is also a "lose, lose" situation for the EU. The Single Market and the European economy will undoubtedly be weaker as a result of Brexit. The political influence of the EU globally will be weaker as a result of Brexit. The loss of our ally on many core issues we defended where we won the argument in EU debates will change the political dynamic in a way that is not good for Ireland. We are working hard to recognise the new political realities and the need for new alliances on key issues such as taxation, competition, fighting against protectionism and ensuring the EU continues to have a globalised view of the world and our place in it. From an Irish, British and EU perspective, Brexit is not good news.

This process is about protecting Ireland, North and South, trying to ensure we limit damage where it is a threat and trying to ensure we sustain and maintain relationships that have been built up between the UK and Ireland, particularly over the past 20 years, in a way that allows us to try to find a way through this really challenging negotiations with those relationships intact. This is why when I hear knee-jerk commentary that because there is a new issue under discussion, it is automatically viewed as a concession, weakness or weakening of our position, I find it frustrating because it is nothing of the sort. This is not meant to sound in any way patronising. It is just a fact. One of the reasons we regularly hold stakeholder group meetings on Brexit, one of the reasons I regularly brief all of the Opposition parties and tell them things that arguably I should not tell them in the context of delicate and, in some cases, confidential negotiations and one of the reasons I have trusted Opposition spokespeople to respect the confidentiality of those briefings, which, by and large, have been respected, is because this is not a party political issue. It is far more fundamental than that. Whoever is in government in six months' time or six years' time will be dealing with the consequences of how these negotiations turn out.

I will go through the sequencing of how we got to where we are without speaking for too long about it. It is important to understand that and the context in which we can get a deal. This time last year, Members might remember that these negotiations were broken up into two different pillars. The first was to try to get a withdrawal agreement agreed while the second was to negotiate a future relationship. A lot of pressure was being built up this time last year to allow the negotiations to move on to stage 2 before stage 1 was fully concluded. Everybody recognised that we were not going to get a full text of a withdrawal agreement agreed before we could start talking about a future relationship so there was a need for progress on the first to be able to start the conversation on the second.

EU countries, along with the UK, were very anxious to move on to opening negotiations on the future relationship, including the future trade and security relationships. We said that Ireland was okay with that but on the condition that we got some guarantees on core issues of vulnerability and sensitivity for Ireland. Those core issues are the three Irish issues in the withdrawal treaty. The first is the common travel area on which we have made very significant progress on a bilateral basis. It is almost a mutual recognition of citizenship - not quite but not far off it - as well as facilitating the freedom to travel, work, study and be treated effectively as a local citizen in the context of accessing services and education. That is largely done.

The second issue is the Good Friday Agreement. We expected, wanted and demanded that we would get very clear agreed language about protecting the Good Friday Agreement in full. The third issue about which we wanted clear commitments and language from the UK side was the Border. Unionists often tell me that it would be helpful to recognise there is a political border on the island of Ireland but that nobody wants it to be a physical barrier anymore, which is true. We said that before we could support the process moving on to stage 2, we needed a very comprehensive political statement or declaration that would be a commitment between the EU and the UK on these core issues.

That is where the December agreement came from. It was hard won. It was a difficult negotiation in the build up to that because we were very demanding and I do not mind saying that because that point in the negotiations was a crucial period for us to calm nerves, particularly in Northern Ireland. There were communities there that felt vulnerable because of Brexit and still do. That is where this backstop concept emerged.

In the context of the solutions about which we are talking, it is important to understand what that is. The backstop emerged from both sides agreeing that we want to solve the Irish Border question to make sure there is no physical border infrastructure or any related checks or controls in the future. We want to solve that through a comprehensive future relationship agreement. That is preference 1. We then said that if it is not possible to do that, preference 2 is for the UK to effectively offer bespoke solutions recognising the unique situation on the island of Ireland in order to solve that border question. At the time, people assumed that would be proposals around technology. We were very sceptical about that but it was not unreasonable to say that we would look at proposals if they were put forward. However, if we could not get agreement on those bespoke solutions, the default position, or backstop, was very clear. It was that the UK committed to maintaining full alignment with the rules of the customs union and Single Market in the areas necessary to protect North-South co-operation, an all-island economy and the peace process.The language was clear. The backstop was not some concept that was not described. It was a fallback position, an insurance mechanism, or a floor below which we could not allow this issue to fall and how it would work was itemised.

In March, which was arguably an even more important agreement that did not get much recognition at the time, that order was reversed. What was agreed in December was that we would try to get a future relationship that would solve the Border question, as well as a whole load of other things, but if it was not possible, option two was a bespoke solution and, if there was not agreement on that, the backstop would kick in. The reverse then happened in March. We said what was needed was to settle people's nerves about the Border question. The British Prime Minister, to her credit, understanding the political sensitivities in Northern Ireland and people's concerns and fears, agreed that there would be a legally operable text on the backstop, consistent with paragraph 49 of the December agreement, which I quoted a minute ago, and it would be in the withdrawal treaty unless and until some other solution was found. In other words, we are putting the insurance mechanism in first, upfront, and then we negotiate a better solution if we can. People say the backstop has to be temporary and short-lived and is a stop-gap to fill a short period of time between the end of a transition period and the agreement on a future relationship. That may be a use for a backstop but it certainly cannot be the limit of its use, that is for sure. The backstop may be temporary but it cannot be designed in a way that requires it to be temporary because then it would not be a backstop at all. That is the truth.

The context in which we are now talking about a review is that we have never had a problem with reviewing a backstop. It is back to option two that was agreed in December whereby, if a backstop is required, in other words, if the future relationship cannot solve the Border question when it is agreed and a backstop kicks in, it is perfectly reasonable that, in time, we would review how it is working and if there are alternative proposals that could do the job more effectively that people would then consider those.

That is not a concession. That is simply working with friends and a neighbour who is also trying to find a solution and trying to find a language that everybody can live with that is consistent with the commitments of December and March. The one thing we cannot allow in that context is that, at the end of any review period, the United Kingdom would unilaterally be able to pull out of the backstop because then it would not be a backstop at all.

We are saying that the unless and until issue is what determines the timeline for the backstop. I hope the backstop will never be used because I hope, during the transition period, we will be able to negotiate a future relationship that is comprehensive enough to ensure that border infrastructure between the United Kingdom and the EU is not required. That will deal with the issue on the island of Ireland and it will also deal with the issue east-west which is a €70 billion trade relationship where 38,000 Irish companies trade with the UK every month and 7,500 companies trade across the Border all the time. That is what we would like to see. Britain has decided at Government level, and I do not believe the people made this decision, not only to leave the European Union but also to leave the customs union and Single Market. That decision creates the real challenge in the context of the Border.

In the context of the decisions and commitments made in December and the commitments made in March, we need to find a legal wording that is watertight and that will stand up to legal scrutiny and challenge because undoubtedly this withdrawal treaty will be challenged in a court somewhere. We need to find a wording that is consistent with the political commitments that have been made. I have to say, and it is not said very often in this Chamber or the other one, that Prime Minister May deserves credit for her commitments to Ireland and her repeated insistence that the commitments she made in December and March need to be part of the withdrawal treaty. She has had to face down a number of prominent politicians in the United Kingdom who have looked to essentially do away with the commitments they made as part of the British Government at the time. I think the Prime Minister and her Cabinet recognise that the commitments they have made need to be followed through on as part of the legal text of the withdrawal treaty and I believe it can be done soon.

We will work with Britain and in particular with Michel Barnier, who has done an astonishingly good job in understanding the complexity of the Irish issues, concerns and vulnerabilities and trying to factor those into the negotiations. If ever there was proof of the benefit of EU membership to Ireland in protecting our core interests, the last 12 months is the proof of that. We have unanimous solidarity and support across the other 26 countries which have their own vested interests and concerns around Brexit but continue to support Ireland. This is the core issue, the last remaining outstanding issue preventing agreement on a final draft of the withdrawal treaty which we are running out of time to agree. There is a good chance this can be agreed this month but we need to continue to work to support the negotiating teams who are negotiating as we speak in Brussels to try to find a way to ensure the backstop that has been committed to is followed through on but that there are review mechanisms built into that to ensure an onus on all of us who have been involved in this process, and will be involved in the future, to ensure the backstop and its use is permanent, if necessary, but also is constantly tested to ensure there are not other mechanisms that we could agree that could equally do the job. That needs to be factored into the future discussion.

I have spent much time in Northern Ireland over the past year. There are genuine fears in Northern Ireland. Nationalists and republicans are understandably sceptical. Memories of the Border are painful and difficult for many people and families and when one speaks to people in the Border areas, they get emotional quickly about this issue. This goes way beyond trade and economics. It is something that is at the core of this Irish question and Ireland's relationship with the United Kingdom and Britain, its history and complexity and, at times, its tragedy. Some people in England, in particular, do not understand or grasp the complexity and depth of that feeling. That is not their fault per se, it is just the reality.

Unionists feel equally fearful, from those I have spoken to, that the solutions we are exploring and the commitments we have got threaten their union. That is why the outcome needs to be one that everybody can live with, that follows through on the commitments in preventing border infrastructure or related checks or controls, but does not and is not seen as undermining the integrity of the United Kingdom as a whole either. The Good Friday Agreement deals with the constitutional issues on this island and Brexit should not interfere with that in any way.

I thank the Senators for their support, in particular Senator Richmond who has been a pillar of strength for our team in media messaging and ensuring the Irish position remains strong, consistent and firm, but also respectful.I hope the political parties in this House can continue to work together until we get this job done. Do not forget that the withdrawal treaty and agreement, if one wants to call it that, is just part 1 of this negotiation. We are at the business end of trying to finalise part 1. If we can get it agreed then we create some certainly that a transition period is going to take place, that citizens' rights issues are settled, that the financial settlement that Britain has to make between now and the end of 2020 with the EU is settled and that the core Irish issues that we insisted last December were addressed as comprehensively as they could be are followed through on to the maximum extent possible. If we can get agreement on that, which is the withdrawal treaty dealing with those four key areas, we will have done a good job in mitigating the potential damage and challenges that Brexit brings. Then we move on to stage 2 which is to get on with the negotiations on the detail of the future relationship which will take at least two years to deliver, and perhaps longer.