Ivana Bacik (Independent) | Oireachtas source

I agree in principle that the broader definition in section 2 should be there, particularly for the work of promotion and advocacy of human rights for a commission, but I can see a practical difficulty if a commission is trying to hold bodies within the State, either private or public, to account by reference to a set of human rights standards that are not contained in the Constitution or in any international treaty or in the European Convention on Human Rights, to which the State is a party. There could be a problem. I note the human rights commission-designate says that even if one uses the wider definition of human rights more extensively in Part 3, one would still have to exclude certain provisions. One could not have compliance notices, for example. It recommends that the wider definition be used, save for section 41 and sections 36 to 39, noting that those functions could only relate to law that is enforceable. It does, however, recommend that a wider definition be used in other sections of Part 3. I wonder if a middle ground could be devised here, because there could be a practical difficulty with extending it throughout all of the provisions of Part 3. That is one issue with the definition.

The second issue is the establishment of the new commission. Independence is a hugely important issue. Section 9 provides a guarantee of that. The funding issue has been highlighted along with the fact that the commission must have adequate resourcing to be effective. We have seen that from the rather controversial history of the Equality Authority, in particular. It is welcome that an amendment was made in section 21 on Committee Stage in the Dáil to make the director the Accounting Officer for the Vote of the commission. The commission will have its own Vote and the Minister has said that administrative arrangements for this are in train. That is hugely important because it was an issue in the observations on the first published version of the Bill produced by the commission-designate and the ICCL.

The third theme is enforcement. An amendment the Minister did not mention but which I consider important was to the title of Part 3, which was originally "Enforcement" and is now "Enforcement and Compliance". That is something the human rights commission-designate recommended because it is a more accurate depiction of the wide range of provisions contained in Part 3.

I wish to refer to three aspects of Part 3. The Minister highlighted some of them. First is the codes of practice issue. The sexual harassment code is a good example of the type of important promotional work bodies can do in seeking to ensure compliance with human rights standards. I hope to see more of that under section 31.

Section 35 deals with the power to conduct an inquiry. There have been recommendations from the ICCL and the human rights commission-designate that changes should be made. I looked carefully at the wording in section 35 - I realise we will deal with this in more detail on Committee Stage - and I believe it is of particular significance now, in the wake of the report Judge John Cooke produced on the Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission, GSOC, bugging allegations. Judge Cooke devoted a significant part of his recommendations to the public interest inquiry power of GSOC. He said that one of the problems, and this was highlighted in the political controversy surrounding those allegations earlier this year, was the lack of specificity of criteria as to when GSOC could conduct a public interest inquiry. It is hugely important that there are very specific criteria in section 35 and that the commission may conduct an inquiry of its own volition, so it does not have to wait for a ministerial request. Also, if one looks carefully at the wording, even if it is requested by the Minister, it does not have to do it. It "may" conduct an inquiry if the commission considers it appropriate and so forth, and the criteria are set out.

This is the sort of power that was in the previous legislation, but was not practicable. This is a more practicable section, but this is not a power that should be or will be exercised lightly. It is important the initiative is left to the commission and that the criteria are clearly spelled out for it and that the procedures are set out in Schedule 2. I am pleased to see this. The GSOC example is an important example of where we are not specific enough and of how we can run into problems where we set out power to conduct a public interest inquiry.
I welcome the new provision in section 42. This new provision was promised in the programme for Government and was sought by different NGOs. It concerns public sector duty and provides that a public body, in the performance of its functions, shall have regard to the need for equality and human rights protection. This is hugely important. At the Joint Committee on Justice, Defence and Equality this morning, we heard of some impressive examples of the work being done currently in the Defence Forces by Commandant Jane Lawlor, gender equality officer, and of the practical way she has begun to ensure gender equality is not just an aspiration in the Defence Forces, but a reality. There is, for example, the insertion of a requirement for people at every stage of promotion to receive some gender and equality training. A requirement is also being introduced to provide that before any members go on a tour of duty abroad, they will complete training on gender based violence and so on. There are practical examples of how Irish troops serving with the UN abroad have made life safer for women and girls who must leave camps to collect water and so on. This work recognises the need to ensure protection. There are impressive examples in practice of how this positive duty on public bodies can be implemented, which is why I believe section 42 is so important.
I welcome Part 5, section 54 and the new enforceable right to compensation in case of judicial error and deprivation of liberty. In regard to the D.G. v.Ireland case, I was in practice and acting in cases where juveniles were detained following the precedent set in that case. Many of us were troubled by that judgment, but it was often used where parents were begging us for some way to ensure a child's safety. However, it was problematic and I am glad to see we have now remedied the issue addressed in the European Court of Human Rights decision.
This merger has been a long time in the making and most of us are keen to see the Bill come into being. I am very disappointed it will be opposed. I assumed, perhaps naively, we might have cross-party consensus on this, because it is essentially a good Bill. I agree there are areas that can be tweaked and discussed, but it is imperative we have a statutory framework for our national human rights and equality body.