John Gilroy (Labour) | Oireachtas source

I have no wish to prolong the debate but I wish to make some comments on this amendment and the section. Senator Mullen speaks of the test of reasonableness. He quotes from the Dunne case of 1989. However, the precedent of reasonableness was established long before that. If memory serves me correctly, it dates back to 1856. Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Company is the test case during which the Lord Justice at the time described reasonableness as the standard of the man on the Clapham omnibus or the man on the street. That is what is considered reasonable. Let us consider reasonableness and juxtapose it with the other term in the section, that is, good faith. There is no possibility of any reasonable person acting in good faith while ignoring the medical evidence. Senator Mullen's concerns are entirely and completely unfounded. They are selective and perhaps even amount to a misunderstanding of the intention of the legislation.

Senator Healy Eames made a point about there being no markers for suicide. She absolutely and fundamentally misunderstands the nature of suicide. There are many objective markers. If we are to say that our consultant psychiatrists are unable to diagnose suicide to within the standard of reasonableness which is required under this legislation, then we might as well say that there is no such thing as suicide or mental illness or the psychiatric profession. That is what we suggesting if we say what Senator Healy Eames has said.

I made the point to Senator Mullen some time ago that it is not the threat of suicide that we are legislating for, but the risk of suicide. The risk of suicide sometimes, but only sometimes, includes the threat of suicide. Other markers include the formulation of a plan, suicidal ideation or perhaps some last final acts. There are many markers that are absolutely, 100% objective and any psychiatrist who says there is none should not be a psychiatrist. It is as simple as that. It would be like a cardiologist being unable to diagnose heart failure. To say or suggest otherwise is to move into an area that is extraordinarily dangerous and amounts to denying that suicide and suicidal ideation are medical emergencies. If we accept that suicide and suicidal ideation and intent are not medical emergencies, then we are in trouble. Further, I believe we are in real trouble by making this argument in the first place.

I started work as a psychiatric nurse in 1984. The stigma associated with mental illness and suicide in 1984 was appalling. We have made, or, we appear to have made, great strides in reducing that stigma. I believe that the conversation in the Chamber and the use of the threat of suicide by opponents of the legislation has set back that work to pre-1984 levels. It is an absolute disgrace.