Dermot Ahern (Louth, Fianna Fail)

Senators will recall that I indicated in this House my intention to bring forward amendments to refine the scope of this section in order to ensure that jury verdicts following receipt of all admissible evidence would not be brought into question. With this in mind this suite of amendments specifies the type of rulings that may be appealed by the prosecution, specifies the standard that must be met before a "with prejudice" appeal may be lodged by the DPP or granted by the Supreme Court and explicitly requires the Supreme Court to consider the interests of justice when assessing the matter.

New subsection (3) inserted by amendment No. 17 contains the key changes to this section. It limits the circumstances in which an appeal shall lie to rulings by a court which erroneously excluded compelling evidence and, in the case of judge directed acquittals, where the direction was wrong in law and the evidence put forward in the proceedings was evidence upon which a jury might reasonably be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the person's guilt in respect of the offence concerned.

At this point, I draw attention to new subsection (12) which is inserted by amendment No. 19. It inserts a definition of "compelling evidence" for the purposes of paragraph (a) of new subsection (3). The formulation in new subsection (3) not only limits the type of ruling which may be appealed under this section to evidential ruling and directed acquittals that were wrong in law but it also requires the DPP to examine the totality of the evidence in the case to determine whether it affords a real prospect of a conviction in the event of a retrial. In the case of a jury acquittal on the merits, the focus on evidential rulings ensures that jury verdicts reached on receipt of all admissible evidence are protected.

Amendment No. 18 is consequential on amendment No. 16 and brought the terminology in subsection (5) into line with that used in new subsections (1) and (2).

Amendment No. 19 substituted existing subsections (9) and (10) with four new subsections.

New subsections (9), (10) and (11) are intended to give more explicit guidance to the Supreme Court when assessing a "with prejudice" appeal. Subsection (9) supplemented by new subsection (10) sets out the matters about which the Supreme Court is to be satisfied before it quashes an acquittal or reverses the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal not to order a retrial. It must be satisfied that the test in subsection (3)(a) or (b) is met and that, having regard to the factors listed in subsection (10), it is in the interests of justice to do so. The factors in subsection (10) which go to the interests of justice test are similar to those that apply in the case of retrial applications under sections 8 and 9. They include whether or not it is likely that any retrial could be conducted fairly and the interests of any victim of the offence concerned.

Subsection (11) again replicates the provisions of sections 8 and 9 which permit the court, when granting a trial order, to make the order subject to such conditions and directions as it considers necessary to ensure the fairness of the trial. New subsection (12) defines "compelling evidence".

Overall, these amendments are intended to ensure due regard is paid to the rights of the acquitted person and that the right to jury trial, a central feature of our criminal justice system, is protected. These amendments follow extensive consultation with the Attorney General and I am satisfied that the procedure, as it now appears, is sufficiently robust.