Rónán Mullen (Independent)

I find I have conflicting attitudes to the amendments. I am inclined to support Senator Norris's amendments. As I have consistently supported the principle that our legislation should be child rather than adult centred, it is difficult to argue against including the concept of a dependent child in amendment No. 2. The wording proposed in amendment No. 22 in regard to any dependent child of either civil partner appears to recognise the possibility that there is a child from a previous relationship. Amendment No. 63 is similar and, as such, deserves our support. However, I oppose the Labour Party amendment because its drafting is poorer and refers to any dependent child or children of the civil partners.

Those who emphasise the importance of putting children's welfare at the centre of policy have rightly identified certain shortcomings in the Bill in terms of its failure to consider the needs of children. However, it is more difficult to get them to engage adequately in the debate on the context in which we should provide for children in the first place. It is undoubtedly the case that some children will be cared for outside marriage or the society of their two parents. Similarly, there will be cases in which same-sex couples care for children who are the offspring of one of the partners. However, I do not want children's welfare to be used, whether accidentally or deliberately, to buttress the argument for making alternative relationships to marriage equally valid in the eyes of the State and society ab initio. In that regard, I understand why the Minister is keeping the issue of children largely separate from this legislation.

In the context of our general discussion on equality, it is interesting to note that our adoption laws provide that in nearly all situations a married couple shall seek to adopt. A single person is allowed to adopt in special circumstances. This is the context in which same-sex couples are often assessed for adoptions. When the legislation was debated in the Dáil in the early 1990s, however, the concept of special circumstances was taken to mean exceptional situations. I understand the example outlined was that of a single person working in an orphanage abroad who wanted to adopt a child. When we are rushing headlong, we can conveniently forget that there are places where our law deems it appropriate to make distinctions.

In regard to the needs of children, I read with interest what the Ombudsman for Children had to say. I disagree with her approving citation of the Colley report on the extension of consideration to adopt any child to same-sex couples because I do not believe this is in the best interests of children. I note, however, that she discussed the need for further measures to support children, including special guardianship orders. She made the point that such orders could be beneficial to children in a range of circumstances beyond those immediately relevant to civil partnership such as step families, families reorganised following divorce or the children of a widow or widower and that an argument could be made in favour of addressing this issue by means of other legislation.

To some degree, this offers us an answer to the puzzle. Instead of lumping together ostensibly well intentioned measures aimed at protecting the welfare of children in civil partnership legislation in a way that might cause confusion about the State's intentions for children, it would be better to legislate at all times from a child-centric perspective. Just as I have argued that civil partnership should be available to all couples in caring dependent relationships who have made sacrifices for each other, our provisions for children should be included in separate legislation in a way that they are not confined to civil partnerships. This would make it clear that our primary and sole motive was securing the welfare and best interests of children.

It has been suggested on occasion that children are more bereft than is actually the case. It is possible, for example, under section 7 of the Guardianship of Infants Act to appoint a testamentary guardian where a non-biological parent is in a partnership of the kind we are discussing. For these reasons, while there is a strong case for making child-centred amendments to the Bill, perhaps an even stronger argument can be made for looking at it as a separate matter precisely because it is not only in the context of civil partnerships that there are gaps in the welfare and well-being of children.