Seanad debates

Tuesday, 30 June 2009

Criminal Justice (Surveillance) Bill 2009: Second Stage

 

4:00 pm

Photo of Feargal QuinnFeargal Quinn (Independent)

I thank Senator Bacik for sharing time.

I look upon this Bill with some experience because during the years I was in the supermarket business there were occasions on which the Garda was able to acknowledge there were threats to the effect that poison would be placed in the supermarkets for blackmail purposes. I do not know how the Garda obtains this kind of information or how it solves cases. It clearly had some sort of information but it would not have been able to use it in court given that doing so is only being made legal now.

Three of my colleagues in the supermarket business have been kidnapped. In the case of Don Tidey and Ben Dunne, there was perhaps subversive activity rather than criminal activity but on another occasion, many years ago, there was criminal activity. My family was very concerned. I am not sure how the Garda handled the case at the time but it was certainly able to do so with ability and knowledge. I do not know the technology it used but the suspects were certainly using technology that was not available elsewhere and which could certainly not have been used in a court of the law had it been used for surveillance by the Garda.

I was stunned at the conviction rate referred to by Senator Regan, namely, 12% of 171 cases involving shootings in the past 11 years. This shows we need modern technology and legislation such as that under discussion.

I was going through a very modern airport in a modern city in Europe last year and noted the equipment being offered for sale in the duty-free shop was exactly the sort that would enable white-collar crime to take place. I had not seen the technology before and I am sure it is not legal to sell it here. However, it is capable of being sold in a duty-free shop in an airport.

A person from another country told me he had some concerns about information from his own company being disclosed. When the company swept its boardroom – I believe this is the phrase used – it found technology being used to disclose information. The individual was not able to tell me exactly what it was used for but it is clear that information very valuable to the company was being stolen by somebody and obtained by somebody else. This is the sort of white-collar crime I am sure we are talking about and about which preventive action should be taken.

I met the former Mayor of the City of New York, Mr. Rudy Giuliani, some years ago. I had read his book in which he spoke about the use of DNA in securing convictions in New York. I asked whether there were concerns over civil liberties and he said there had been some. However, he referred to a case in which a person ready to be charged was proven not to be the culprit through the analysis of DNA. The suspect would have had considerable difficulty only that the analysis of DNA relieved him of the possible charge that would have been applied to him.

There is an obvious concern that surveillance powers can be abused by a state, not only in undemocratic countries but also in democratic ones. Senator Bacik and others referred to this. However, with this particular Bill, it must be kept in mind that the new powers afforded to the Garda will allow it to fight like with like, just as criminals have been monitoring gardaí for a long time and using monitoring as a weapon against the Garda through intimidation and other means.

I have a concern raised with me by a former detective superintendent in the Garda Síochána and former national head of Interpol and Europol, the international and European police information exchanges, respectively. He stated:

In my view this Bill fails two tests, those of common sense and what I will call "investigatory necessity", and by a considerable margin, for the following reasons.

1. It adopts a generalist approach by seeking to apply this law to the entire population and not directly to criminal organisations as defined in the Criminal Justice Act 2006.

2. The threats emanate from specific and defined sources, criminal gangs and subversive organisations. The threats do not emanate from the population as a whole and arguably the population as a whole should not be subjected to these measures.

3. The definition of surveillance data is far too wide.

4. It can be construed to include all surveillance activity, including intelligence and evidential material.

5. The material received from foreign agencies could be disclosable and electronic devices fitted by them to assist Irish authorities could be rendered inadmissible.

6. There may be a loss of confidence at international level in the Irish systems which may inhibit the flow of intelligence and subsequently of evidence.

7. The rules on disclosure are unclear.

8. It is not clear if telephones and electronic mail are covered. [I believed they were.] Some of the measures may have the effect of neutralising current surveillance practices, particularly in relation to telephone intercepts and electronic mail.

9. Placing authorisations at the District Court level is unnecessarily indulgent and it exposes a greater number to possible threats from the criminal elements. [I would like the Minister to comment on this.]

10. The authorisation process is rigid at the operational level and lacks operational reality.

11. The rules on privilege are also unclear.

12. Surveillance officers may be compromised in terms of personal safety and their identities may become known to the criminal gangs.

This legislation is necessary and has reasonable balance. I have some concerns based on the detective superintendent's experience of Interpol and Europol and I would like to ensure they are taken into account.

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