Maurice Cummins (Fine Gael)

Tairgim leasú a 4:

I gCuid 1, leathanach 7, línte 32 go 49 a scriosadh, agus leathanach 9, línte 1 go 7 a scriosadh agus an méid seo a leanas a chur ina n-ionad:

"14° Ní choisceann aon fhoráil atá sa Bhunreacht ar an Oireachtas reachtaíocht a achtú chun cinntí a rialáil nó a dhéanamh, nó chun éifeacht a thabhairt do chinntí den sórt sin, faoi na Conarthaí ach amháin i ndáil le haon bheartas um chomhchosaint a mbeadh an Stát san áireamh inti.",

agus

I gCuid 2, leathanach 9, línte 42 go 49 a scriosadh, agus leathanach 11, línte 1 go 17 a scriosadh, agus an méid seo a leanas a chur ina n-ionad:

"14° No provision of the Constitution prevents the Oireachtas from enacting legislation to regulate, give effect to or take decisions under the Treaties except in relation to any common defence policy which would include the State.".

I move amendment No. 4:

In Part 1, page 6, to delete lines 32 to 49, and in page 8, to delete lines 1 to 7, and substitute the following:

"14° Ní choisceann aon fhoráil atá sa Bhunreacht ar an Oireachtas reachtaíocht a achtú chun cinntí a rialáil nó a dhéanamh, nó chun éifeacht a thabhairt do chinntí den sórt sin, faoi na Conarthaí ach amháin i ndáil le haon bheartas um chomhchosaint a mbeadh an Stát san áireamh inti.",

and

In Part 2, page 8, to delete lines 42 to 49, and in page 10, to delete lines 1 to 17 and substitute the following:

"14° No provision of the Constitution prevents the Oireachtas from enacting legislation to regulate, give effect to or take decisions under the Treaties except in relation to any common defence policy which would include the State.".

Subsection 14° of Part 2 deals with the Passerelle options, which provide that the Council can decide unanimously to replace unanimous voting in the Council of Ministers with qualified majority voting in specified areas set out in subsection 14.

In simple terms, this means where an element of policy is decided unanimously by Council, the relevant matters may be decided by qualified majority voting in the future. To do so, however, the Council needs to decide unanimously to make this change, giving each country a veto at the outset. It is essential to remember this provision simply pertains to a change in the decision making process, not the competences of the Union itself. In voting for this process, the Government would never require a constitutional referendum. The powers to engage in this procedure and vote at the Council of Ministers are already inherent in Government. It is clear the Government is including the provision in this Bill solely for the purpose of transparency.

My amendment revises subsection 14° and suggests a clearer text. We have received oral and written confirmation from the Minister of State that the insertion of this subsection into Article 29 of the Constitution is not necessary. The powers contained within it are already inherent in the Government and do not require explicit conferring in this manner.

The insertion of this detailed provision is perhaps intended to pre-empt the "No" campaign inasmuch as it may accuse the Government of covering up the Passerelle provisions. While we understand that rationale, we are not of the view that inserting unnecessarily detailed and time limited provisions into the Constitution is good practice. We have already alluded to our desire in regard to Senator Alex White's amendment to avoid overburdening the Constitution with too much detail. The tenor, quality and integrity of the Constitution would be at risk if a series of such amendments were made. It is a principle of good constitutional practice and drafting that the text be succinct and clear, and that it operates exclusively as the higher law. Specific powers should be created under statute. The effect of the proposed subsection is to insert an unnecessary specific provision which is legislatively detailed and limited in time. This amendment should, therefore, be accepted.