Michael Brennan (Progressive Democrats)

This is a suitable, strong and timely motion and I add my support to the points made and words of genuine concern expressed in the House tonight. This motion is timely for one particular reason, on which I will use my few minutes to expand. On 11 May, the RPII made a presentation to the Joint Committee on the Environment and Local Government. The RPII deserves credit for its presentation and much of what it had to say should form part of our discussion. Regarding nuclear power plants in operation in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, the RPII ensures up-to-date information on accident scenarios that are likely to impact on Ireland is available to inform our emergency arrangements. During its presentation, the RPII summarised briefly the background to its recent visit to Sellafield and the issues of most concern to Ireland. I will recount this summary, as both positive and negative findings should be aired when debating the plant.

The RPII has concluded that the routine operations at the Sellafield site give rise to radiation doses that are not significant from a health point of view. Most of these doses result from exposure to radioactivity discharged in previous years, specifically in the 1970s and 1980s. The RPII found that, unless a very significant increase in discharges occur, these doses are not expected to increase by a large amount in the future. On the other hand, based on information provided during the RPII's visit to Sellafield, the worst credible and reasonably foreseeable accident involving storage tanks could result in levels of contamination to the food chain here that would require intervention by the Irish authorities.

I will now address an issue that is often raised in connection with the matter of Sellafield, which is the risk to Ireland from a terrorist attack on the plant. According to the RPII, while there is a well established and internationally accepted framework for assessing the safety of nuclear installations in respect of accidental failures, the situation with regard to terrorist attacks is very different. There is no widely accepted or transparent methodology for assessing risks or consequences. In Sellafield's case, I understand the UK authorities have re-evaluated their assessment for the threat of terrorism. However, this information has not been made available to the institute on the basis that it might compromise security and safety at the site. Perhaps there is some role for our Government in making the relevant information available to the State in a confidential manner.

However, the RPII also indicated that the UK's nuclear installations inspectorate, the NII, has reassured it that there is now a high level of protection in the form of engineered safety assistance and physical security. In so far as possible, the NII has looked at various aeroplane flight paths that could impact on the tanks. As regards how aircraft could breach the tanks — and given the strength of the tanks at that point — it is believed that there would not be a serious risk from an 11 September 2001-style attack. More work should be done to reassure the public, both here and in the United Kingdom, in this regard. At this point, I believe most people would share my healthy scepticism on the issue.

People here and in Britain are unhappy about the operation of Sellafield. The history of the plant is somewhat worrying, so I am glad that this matter is being kept under the spotlight by debates both in this House and outside it.