Noel Ahern (Dublin North West, Fianna Fail)

On behalf of the Minister, Deputy Roche, and the Department, I am pleased to strongly support this motion on the Sellafield nuclear plant. While this plant lies in the jurisdiction of our near neighbour, the United Kingdom, at its closest point it is located less than 120 miles off our coast. The Irish Sea has been subject to continuing radioactive discharges for over 50 years. Due to the potential risks from a major accident or other incident, Sellafield represents potentially the most serious health, environmental and economic hazard to this island.

Ireland rejected the use of nuclear power many years ago. Our position on Sellafield is that the Government will not rest in its efforts to secure the safe closure of the Sellafield plant. We will continue to take all diplomatic, political and legal avenues open to us to achieve that aim.

The most recent serious incident at the THORP plant only confirms our resolve in that position. While our efforts have been successful in securing greater understanding and a better flow of information between the UK and Ireland, particularly in the past year or so, that does not in any sense undermine our fundamental policy regarding Sellafield.

For our part, I assure the House that the Minister, Deputy Roche, and the Department will leave no stone unturned in pressing the concerns of the Irish people in seeking the safe closure of Sellafield. To this effect, the Minister wrote this week to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs seeking a meeting to discuss the issue.

I am aware that all Members of this House are at one in agreeing that Sellafield continues to be an issue of widespread concern among Irish people. As an endorsement of that, I need only refer to research undertaken on behalf of the British-Irish Council and the British Embassy in Dublin in 2003 on attitudes among Irish people to the UK in the 21st century. Some 80% of those surveyed considered that the relationship between the two Governments was good or excellent. However, the contrast was striking when the issue of Sellafield was brought into the frame. A significant 72% of those sampled considered that, on the issue of Sellafield, there remained much room for improvement.

While the relationship between Ireland and the UK has never been better, Sellafield sticks out like a sore thumb. We still have a very long and difficult journey to travel on this issue. It is evidence of the deep difference in policy perspectives between both Governments and the lack of real engagement on the issue that our Government felt obliged to engage in international legal proceedings against the United Kingdom on Sellafield. That reflected the continuing concerns of the Government to demonstrate the seriousness of the issues and place them centre stage.

Ireland initiated legal proceedings on two separate fronts against the Sellafield MOX plant under the 1992 OSPAR Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS.

Oral hearings in the OSPAR proceedings took place in the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in October 2002. The objective of the OSPAR action was to bring about the disclosure of certain information that had been excluded from two economic reports commissioned by the UK on the MOX plant. The information had been withheld by the UK on the grounds of commercial confidentiality.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration tribunal issued its award on 2 July 2003. Although Ireland failed to gain access to the confidential information withheld from the UK public consultation papers because the tribunal deemed that the information sought was not environmental information, it did determine that Ireland has a right to access information on the marine environment. The tribunal also determined that the UK had an obligation to make such information available and that Ireland has a right of redress under the convention to vindicate its rights to such information. The tribunal therefore established a number of extremely important international legal precedents.

In October 2001, Ireland launched separate legal proceedings against the UK on the MOX plant under UNCLOS. That arbitration remains suspended pending resolution of jurisdictional issues in the dispute raised by the EU Commission. The legal proceedings between Ireland and the EU Commission on those jurisdictional issues which deal with access by member states to dispute procedures provided under UNCLOS are continuing. Written pleadings in this case before the European Court of Justice have been completed and it is expected that the hearing will take place later this year.

However, the UNCLOS tribunal issued an order in June 2003 after hearing an application by Ireland for provisional measures. The provisional measures award and orders recommended that Ireland and the UK enter into dialogue to improve co-operation and consultation between the two Governments and report to the tribunal on specified dates. These discussions are continuing.

It has been the Minister's view for some time that there is significant scope for both Governments and administrations to develop a higher level of co-operative engagement on the nuclear issue. He does not consider that such engagement will compromise our position on the fundamental policy differences on Sellafield and the broader nuclear issue between the two Governments. What it can and should do, is provide a platform for informed engagement on the issues that divide us. It is in this context that the provisional measures order of the UNCLOS tribunal was opportune and significant. This order provided for the development of improved co-operation and co-ordination measures between both Governments on the nuclear issue.

At the first opportunity the Minister reported on the progress from the co-operation discussions, at the signing of an agreement on notification and exchange of information arrangements between Ireland and the UK in December last. The agreed package of measures announced then is designed to address a wide range of issues related to nuclear safety. The package facilitates visits to Sellafield by the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland, RPII, and the Garda Síochána. It also provides real time access for the RPII to the UK's radiation monitoring system and it includes a series of initiatives to develop and improve existing co-operation arrangements between both Governments. This package of measures represents progressive, practical and real improvements in the relationship between Ireland and the UK on the nuclear issue.

The measures deal with the sharing of information, which is vital for emergency planning in the event of an accident or incident at a nuclear plant. They are about improving communication, co-operation and co-ordination between friendly neighbouring states. They cover identifying risks and threats and enabling national authorities to exchange information on, plan for, and actively address those risks in an informed way. Fundamentally, they deal with identifying areas of mutual interest and concern and putting in place systems and structures to enable those areas to be addressed.

Senators are aware of the recently published report by the RPII on its visit to Sellafield and I am sure they will join with me in complimenting the institute on its work. Its report, which should be widely read, is the essence of clarity on a difficult and complex technical issue. This co-operation allows our experts to advise and inform the public and the Government with the benefit of having visited the Sellafield site. It is the intention of the UK to facilitate further visits by the RPII to Sellafield. I welcome this and the Government appreciates the professional and expert engagement of the institute's board and staff in this important process.

While the package of measures developed and put in place represents significant progress, the historically poor safety record and recent events at the plant only exacerbate the real concerns of the Government about Sellafield. This poor safety record and the recent incident at the thermal oxide reprocessing plant, THORP, also reinforces the clear commitment given in the programme for Government that we will continue to work towards the safe and orderly closure of the Sellafield plant.

Following a September 1999 finding that quality control data for MOX fuel destined for Japan had been falsified, the UK safety regulator published three investigative reports. The first dealt with the scandal itself. The second report stated that there was "a lack of a high quality safety management system", "insufficient resources to implement even the existing safety management system" and that there was a "lack of an effective independent inspection, auditing and review system within BNFL". The UK regulator made 28 recommendations, the implementation of which was required to fully meet the standards expected of a nuclear site licensee.

In March 2004, the EU Commission issued a directive to the UK because of an infringement of the safeguards provisions of the EURATOM Treaty relating to the accounting for nuclear material in a storage pond, B30, at the Sellafield nuclear plant. This storage pond, apart from breaching the safeguards provisions of the Euratom Treaty, is also a significant radioactive and environmental challenge that needs to be addressed.

The recent spill at the THORP plant was a very serious incident. I understand that following detailed evaluation the incident has been assigned as a class 3 incident under the international nuclear event scale. A malfunction occurred within the process in the plant where the spent fuel is sheared and dissolved, and shearing was suspended on 18 April. Camera inspections were subsequently carried on 20 April in order to inspect the vessels and pipework in the feed clarification cell. This inspection identified a failure in the pipework system along with signs of liquor spillage and some corrosion of the structural steelwork adjacent to the tank. As a precautionary measure, the front end of the plant's reprocessing operations was closed down on 21 April.

The spillage, which contains uranium, plutonium and fission products, is on the floor of a sealed cell with walls several feet thick, but the amount involved was approximately 15,000 gallons. Given that the spillage was contained in a secondary containment area, there has been no abnormal activity in the air and no risk to employees, the local community or the environment. In particular and thankfully, the incident has no immediate implications for Ireland.

Notification of the incident by the UK authorities to Ireland was made on 21 April. Notification arrangements were in accordance with the established procedures for the exchange of information about such incidents. Given the need to examine, assess and evaluate the incident itself by the UK authorities in order to establish the circumstances involved, the RPII has confirmed that in its view the notification by the UK authorities was prompt and effective. Additional information is being made available to the institute by the UK authorities as the situation develops.

These examples are indicative of the concerns raised for this Government and the Irish public by the continued operation of the Sellafield nuclear plant. The THORP incident, in particular, has again brought into sharp focus in Ireland and among a number of other EU member states, the very strong and real concerns the public has with many aspects of the nuclear industry in general and Sellafield in particular.

The highly-active storage tanks represent the most significant terrorist threat in Sellafield. The UK authorities have implemented a number of enhanced physical protection measures in attempts to address this risk. Additionally, assurances to the effect that the terrorist threat to Sellafield nuclear plant is continually reviewed and assessed have been received from the UK authorities. Nevertheless, the Government has continuing concerns regarding the threat posed by the tanks and this is one of the issues addressed in the international legal actions undertaken by the Government.

There is an obvious conflict between the necessity for the UK authorities to ensure the security of the installation is not compromised by limiting access to security sensitive material and the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland's need for access to information to provide advice to the Government and the public regarding threat assessments and security arrangements. In this regard, the access provided by the UK authorities to the Garda Síochána has been useful. Further visits and contacts at senior police level are continuing. Access to further information sought by the institute is also one of the issues being addressed in the UNCLOS discussion process. The Government will continue to keep the national emergency plan for a nuclear accident up to date to the highest international standards.

In 2002, potassium iodate tablets were made available to households nationwide as part of the national emergency plan for nuclear accidents.