Cyprian Brady (Fianna Fail)

I second the motion. I welcome the Minister of State to the House and welcome the opportunity to speak on an issue that affects us all. I commend the person who compiled the motion because it captures concisely and accurately the seriousness with which this and previous Governments have taken the issue.

Until the events of 11 September 2001, the idea of Sellafield and the possible consequences for Ireland of an accident or terrorist attack were taken with little seriousness. In some quarters it was only considered with a degree of cynicism. However, since then we realise that such things happen and the probability is that they will happen. Whether we like it, we must plan for such events. When talking about the United Kingdom, we are not just talking about Sellafield.

The United Kingdom currently has 14 nuclear plants at various stages of production and decommissioning, 12 of which are magnox reactors, a UK technology introduced in the 1940s and 1950s which has not progressed much since. It is widely accepted that this technology is inefficient and unsafe. Sellafield has two processors, one of which is a magnox plant which has been decommissioned and the other a thermal oxide reprocessing plant, THORP, in which nuclear waste from throughout Europe and Japan is reprocessed.

A debate is currently raging in the United Kingdom as to whether to continue with a nuclear power programme because by 2010, all bar two of the UK plants will be decommissioned. However, the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland informs us:

Decommissioning, by its nature, is a slow process that extends over several decades and current estimates are that decommissioning and final site remediation of BNFL Sellafield will not be completed until about 2150 (i.e. 150 years from now).

As I have said, this will affect generations to come, not just ourselves and our children.

The RPII is one of those bodies whose work only comes to public attention when there is a major incident or accident. However, it has played a crucial role in assisting this and the previous Government in achieving its current position of contact and monitoring between our officials and UK Government officials. Since the initiation of international legal proceedings against the United Kingdom by Ireland in 2002 — on which I congratulate the Ministers of the time, Deputies Cullen and Noel Dempsey — under the OSPAR Convention and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS, in 2003, the institute has worked extremely closely with legal, governmental and diplomatic teams to further the Irish cause with regard to Sellafield.

The actions taken have resulted in the setting out of a very important international legal precedent regarding access to information for Ireland under the OSPAR Convention. Under the UNCLOS Convention, as Senator Kitt stated, the fight continues. So far, despite questions about EU competency in certain areas and other issues, it has resulted in much improved co-operation and in access and consultation arrangements being put in place. Given the nature of what we are dealing with, it is clear that more needs to be done, although we have done a significant amount of work. The RPII's recent report on its visit to Sellafield does not make for very good reading.

A bilateral agreement was signed in December 2004 after many years of struggle. It provided for visits by the RPII and the Garda to Sellafield and access by this country's authorities to the UK's radiation monitoring system, RIMNET. Ireland receives a great deal of support at EU level and from Scandinavian countries like Sweden and Norway. A significant amount of work remains to be done, however, as Senator Kitt said. The sea and the air around our coasts are being continually monitored. We need to resolve some major issues.

There have been many developments since Ireland started to take legal action in this regard. The Calder Hall reactors at Sellafield were closed in March 2003. The RPII is dealing with two specific matters, the first of which is the discharges from the 1970s and 1980s. While there is no significant risk at present, continuous monitoring of the discharges, in particular, is essential. It is accepted that the reductions in discharges which have been sought by the Government will not be achieved until 2020. It is worrying that the authorised discharge, as laid down by the UK environment agency, is greater than the current rate of discharge. There is scope for BNFL to decide to increase the discharges at some stage in the future, for commercial reasons, for example. That is worrying when one considers the nature of the discharges.

The second specific matter with which the RPII is dealing is the safe storage of nuclear liquid waste. Such waste, which is stored in tanks at present, accounts for approximately 90% of the radioactive waste at Sellafield at present. I started to understand the commercial nature of this system when I read the section of the RPII report that stated that it would cost approximately £150 million per year until 2020 to clean a magnox fuel storage pond. The substantial commercial and economic pressure that is being placed on the UK Government in this regard is part of the reason for the delays in this area. The Irish Government has to maintain its diplomatic and governmental pressure to get the UK authorities to move on this issue.

According to the RPII report, there have been improvements in physical security at Sellafield as a result of contacts which have been built up. Such security measures, including improved fencing around the various sections of Sellafield and increases in the number of armed security guards on the site, have been deemed necessary in light of the threat of terrorist attack and the possibility of accidents. The problem is that there is no framework for assessing the risks and consequences of a terrorist attack. Plans can be put in place and certain measures can be taken, but there is no framework for assessing the risks involved. We should not forget that the onus is on BNFL and the UK Government to provide adequate security measures.

The Government has sought the technical information that will be necessary in real time in the case of an accident or a terrorist incident. There will be no point in telling the Irish authorities about an incident an hour, half an hour or 15 minutes after it takes place. We need to get information in real time. The RPII has worked hard to get such information. Recent exercises have indicated that the notification arrangements are working well, which has been welcomed by the RPII. The RPII has expressed deep concern about the lack of access to information about security issues and threat assessment arrangements. The mantra used by the Sellafield authorities is that such information cannot be exchanged for security reasons.

Given the nature of this issue and the proximity of Ireland to the nuclear installations in the UK, it is right that the Government has committed itself to demanding the closure of Sellafield, which is the bottom line. Even if the plant is closed, there will be a continuing need to monitor and assess its impact. I warmly welcome and second the motion, which succinctly and correctly sets out the position the Government has taken.