Feargal Quinn (Independent)

We are now coming to the terms of reference of the commission; I refer to amendment No. 51. We should use this opportunity to revisit the terms of reference of the commission, as by doing so we can ensure we get the best possible result from its deliberations. We can also ensure that the commission is not unduly restricted or hampered in any way by restrictions we put on it regarding what it may discuss and consider. I am aware that the Minister consulted the commission at the outset about its terms of reference to ensure that its members were happy with the brief they were given.

However, that should not inhibit any of us from looking at the terms of reference again. Much water has flowed under the bridge in a very short time, and we should certainly revisit the terms of reference in the light of the interim report of the commission and the possibilities opened up by that report. Amendment No. 51 covers an eventuality I sincerely hope will not happen, but prudence demands that we provide for it in case it does. We must be ready for the worst case scenario, in which the commission comes back to us and states it cannot certify satisfactorily the secrecy and the accuracy of the system that has been chosen. I hope that does not happen.

Like the Government, and most people in the country, I hope that we have not thrown €50 million away on this project. I hope, as everyone does, that the commission will eventually find it possible to certify the chosen system, not because I have any flag to fly for the manufacturers of the present system, but simply because we have already invested so much money in that system. However, I am equally convinced that the fact that money has been spent on a system is not an argument for continuing with that system if it fails to deliver the goods, the goods in this case being a system the independent commission is prepared to certify. We should provide for the worst-case scenario. If the commission cannot certify the chosen system, what then?

The people we should look to for an answer to that question are the commission members. They are the people best placed to tell us how to move forward in looking for a voting system that is likely to be capable of certification. My amendment provides that in the event that it is unable to certify satisfactorily the chosen system as it stands, it will be open to the commission to set out what it considers to be an appropriate specification for any future system, including the necessity, appropriateness or desirability of using publicly-accessible open source software. Senators will note that this wording does not require the commission to set out a specification for any future system but merely leaves it open to them to do so should they deem it appropriate.

It also leaves it open to the commission to consider an issue which was the subject of many of the submissions received during the first stage of its work, namely the question of whether open source software should be specified for a project such as this. This is a vitally important issue which has not been sufficiently discussed in public. Senators will probably be aware there are two distinct types of software available: one is proprietary software which, as the name implies, is wholly the property of the company producing it. To preserve the rights in that property, the actual source software is kept strictly secret and not even the person who licenses the software from the company has the right to see into the actual source software itself. In a very real sense, therefore, one is buying a pig in a poke. Another characteristic of proprietary software is also highly relevant in the present case — when one buys proprietary software one is locking oneself in to one supplier for all time. If one wants to change supplier, one has to throw away the entire investment up to that point and start again from scratch with another supplier. Once we have chosen the Nedap-Powervote system we are stuck with their software for as long as we want to go on using their machines.

The alternative approach, which we have not adopted in this case, is to specify open source software. As its name implies, open source software is indeed open as the source software is publicly available. It can be inspected by anyone and can be used by anyone. If one uses open source software for electronic voting, one is using a system where the software is not secret at all. Strangely this can enhance rather than take away from the security of the overall voting process. Because the software is open it can be inspected by a wide range of experts and any faults in it can be clearly identified. The main advantage of open source software is that using it does not tie one to one manufacturer for all time. As things develop one can, if one wishes, put the project out to tender again and choose a new supplier. That new supplier does not have to throw away the existing investment, but can build on it. I have no wish here to make a case for either proprietary software or open source software. Clearly, if we were starting again from scratch — I hope we will not have to — the first question we should discuss and decide on is whether to go for open source or proprietary in terms of the software we choose. That is the fundamental first question that would need to be asked. This is the reason the issue is mentioned in this amendment.

If the commission should fail to certify the existing chosen system, then it should be open to it to set out a specification for any future system. It should also be open to it to consider, if it so wishes, this fundamental issue of whether we should in future choose proprietary or open source software. As prudent legislators it is our duty to consider all the possibilities and make provision for anything that may happen.

There have been many surprises on this road already, not all of them totally pleasant. Let us at least show that we have thought out the various possibilities, and provided a response to them. I commend this amendment to the House.