Feargal Quinn (Independent)

I support Senator Bannon. I refer to amendment No. 52. Of the five themes the commission identified among the large number of submissions it received, the first was "the need for a voter verified paper audit trail to ensure that the accuracy of the results can be checked independently of the new system itself". The commission acknowledged the issue fell outside its terms of reference but it also acknowledged it had a bearing on the successful implementation of the chosen system. It broadly hinted a voter verified paper audit trail would be a desirable, perhaps even a necessary, element in ensuring the new system was fully accepted by the public. That is an invitation to us, as legislators, to broaden the terms of reference of the commission to include the issue of a verifiable paper trail.

This is an enabling rather than a prescriptive amendment. It leaves it open to the commission to consider the issue; it is not required to do so. I raised this issue first more than three years ago and a number of my comments are worth recapping. At a conceptual level what is at stake is a move from voting with an audit trail to voting without an audit trail and not a shift from paper-based voting to electronic voting. That is the basic difference.

Under the current system, the key characteristic is the physical existence of a vote on paper, which is tracked at every stage. Before a vote becomes a vote, it is counted and the number of ballot papers is carefully controlled. Each paper is recorded and this takes place in full public view. A vote becomes a vote when a voter records his or her choice on that paper. The voter can examine the paper and handle it before giving it up to confirm that the paper reflects his or her intentions. He marks it, examines it again and goes with that.

The fact that the vote is secret does not mean it disappears from view. It is counted going into the ballot box and again when it is taken out. The ballot paper is guarded while it is in the box. The counting takes place in public so everyone can see it and, if there is a recount, the physical evidence is there to do it. The entire process is so open and visible that the voter has total trust in the integrity of the system and this has not been questioned throughout the history of the State. The fundamental reason for this is the existence of a physical audit trail from start to finish. Our unquestioning trust in the system rests on that foundation.

I physically create my vote by marking the ballot paper and, from that moment, the ballot is handled in a way that virtually eliminates the possibility of fraud or error. There is no fraud because the ballot is overseen, while there is no error because the raw material is there for a recount if there is a question of doubt. However, under the new system a voter will indicate choices by pressing the relevant parts of a touchable screen and these will be electronically recorded on a medium such as a cassette or cartridge. The voter will not see the record and he or she must trust the technology to ensure his or her voting intentions are fully and correctly recorded.

There is no feedback, confirmation or guarantee that the voter's intentions have been properly translated into digital impulses. Under the new system the moment of truth, the instant of voting, will disappear into a black hole and it can never be retrieved. The Bill provides for detailed regulations for the care of the recording medium before and after the voting has taken place. The regulations will ensure the counting process can be undertaken repeatedly. However, it does not provide for a means to allow us to inspect whether the translation of the voter's intentions into digital impulses was properly carried out. The new system will require an act of faith that the current system does not require. That, in a nutshell, is what the entire discussion on electronic voting is all about.

In moving from a manual to an electronic system, must we also move from a system with a verifiable audit trail to a system without such a trail? That fundamental question has not been addressed. No body is better placed or qualified to address this question than the commission on electronic voting. It should, therefore, be left open to the commission's members to consider the issue and to report on it, if they so wish.

The purpose of amendment No. 19 is to enable the holding of parallel testing of the system in an election. In other words, as part of the testing of the chosen system, it should be tested alongside the existing system in an election in real time. The commission cited the absence of such testing as one of the reasons it was unable to certify the accuracy of the chosen system on page 20 of its interim report. It stated:

There has been no parallel testing of the system in a real election, either against the traditional manual system of voting or against an alternative electronic means; such parallel testing is very important for such a critical system as voting at elections: although the system was deployed on a pilot basis in 2002, these elections were not run in parallel with a paper ballot, and the software has been modified many times since then.

During full testing of the system the commission will seek an element of parallel testing. There is no other way of interpreting its comments. If, on this occasion, it was unable to certify the accuracy of the system because, inter alia, it lacked recourse to parallel testing, it follows that in future testing the same constraint will apply. However, the need for this amendment arises because the Bill does not provide for such a parallel system to operate. This is important and the legislation will be faulty if this provision is not included whereas it will be greatly improved if it is included.

The Minister is open to having a manual election in a number of constituencies and an electronic election in other constituencies. That was done during the last election. However, it is not open to him to have both a manual and an electronic election in the same constituency in the same election. In other words, no provision in existing legislation or in this Bill would permit the parallel testing that the commission sees as indispensable to its coming to a firm conclusion on the accuracy of the proposed system.

The Bill creates a catch 22. On the one hand, it sets out to empower the commission to complete its work and to give the chosen system a clean bill of health. On the other, it does not create the powers necessary for the proper testing to take place, as far as this aspect of parallel testing is concerned. That is a nonsense and it cannot be allowed to stand. This is an example of the way in which the interim report of the commission has made it imperative to revise this Bill before it is enacted. For these reasons, I commend this amendment to the House.

The amendment makes a great deal of sense and would provide great confidence in the legislation. A parallel testing system should be provided.