Sheila Terry (Fine Gael)

I thank the Minister. There appear to be two related concepts in the Bill, namely, "brought" and "accrued", and it is important that we should clarify their exact application.

The reduction of the Statute of Limitations period from three years to one is dramatic. Medical personnel would argue that some injuries do not manifest themselves for quite some time. Even if they materialise and heal within one year and recur, a person could be denied the opportunity to initiate a legitimate claim. While I agree that the three-year period is too long, we should reconsider decreasing it to one year, particularly in the case of people who may have legitimate claims which arise outside that period.

I welcome section 8 which states that personal injury actions will operate according to the rules of the court. In other words, they will be dealt with swiftly. I understand that something similar to a timetable is in place for judicial review actions, where each step in the legal process is supposed to happen within a set timeframe. However, I am informed by legal practitioners, that this timetable is rarely, if ever, observed. Foot-dragging and delaying continue to slow down these cases. Adjournments and time extensions are commonplace. There is nothing in section 8 which leads me to believe that personal injury actions will be dealt with any more swiftly than at present.

Notices for particulars are already used in personal injury and other cases. I fail to see how section 10 will improve on this practice. Similarly, section 11 specifies the contents of a defence. The Minister is aware that it is really a formality because everything is denied and contested. This does little to assist in resolving the case. Section 11 does nothing to improve on the current position and the same can be said of section 12.

I welcome section 13. It is a sad reflection on our society that claimants will be required to swear an affidavit before making claims. However, this is what we have driven ourselves to. This is the most important provision in the Bill. The success of the legislation will either stand or fall on the basis of this section. Claimants who have to swear affidavits will think twice about the veracity of the information on their claim forms. However, a measure such as this is only as strong as its level of enforcement. Day after day judges express preference for the evidence of one witness over another. We frequently hear about judges labelling witnesses as unreliable or untruthful. However, we hear about few cases of perjury being taken. In contrast, there have been a number of high profile cases of perjury in the UK. Two of these involved former politicians, Lord Archer and Jonathan Aitken, who were both jailed for admitting perjury and perverting the course of justice. It is clear that the offence of perjury is far better policed in other jurisdictions. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that their oaths are more closely adhered to than is currently the case in Ireland. Until that matter is addressed, the effectiveness of section 13 will be quite limited.

Sections 21 and 22 are connected with this and their success will again be dependent on how frequently these provisions are enforced. It has always been an offence to produce false evidence and there is nothing new in these provisions in that regard. Perhaps the Minister might move more swiftly towards putting the common law offence of perjury on a statutory footing, rather than dealing with it in this higgledy-piggledy way.

I welcome the introduction of mediation. Many cases are settled before they reach court. Formalising the process in this way might help to ensure that cases are settled earlier. The final offer measures provided for in section 16 are along the same lines as the court lodgement procedure already in place. I welcome section 19 which allows the court to appoint experts. This will hopefully relegate conflicting reports to the past and should help speed up cases.

Section 25 is the offence provision. It is drafted in such a way as to indicate that offences under this Bill are primarily indictable. However, section 2 introduces the potential for protracted legal argument. It will enable someone charged with an offence to drive a coach and four through this Bill and effectively allow him or her to evade the most severe penalties.

In some ways this Bill is a textbook example of how not to legislate. It primarily deals with making claims but it also deals with a number of varied and unconnected matters. Chapter 1 goes on a complete tangent and deals with the issue of dormant court accounts. Chapter 2 lists 12 innocuously entitled "miscellaneous provisions" which make some significant changes. The first change is that the in camera rule as we know it will no longer exist. The level of secrecy attached to family law proceedings has been so restrictive that it has hampered any meaningful study of this area of law and of our society. I am in favour of the relaxation of the in camera rule to allow official law reporting to be expanded. I also welcome a proposal of this kind to allow studies to be conducted of the family law courts. This will give us a greater understanding of the working of the family law courts and, in particular, it will give us a clearer picture of the kind of orders being made in this area. However, I would not be in favour of relaxing the in camera rule to allow journalistic coverage of family law cases. In that context, the element of privacy that attaches to these cases must remain.

In keeping with this tenor of diversity, the Bill also deals with interest on costs and finally seems to eliminate the concept of rateable valuation from legislation and replaces it with the more accessible idea of market value. This is to be welcomed although I do not think I saw hundreds of angry protesters calling for such a radical reform. I generally welcome the Bill.