Pat Gallagher (Donegal South West, Fianna Fail)

I welcome this opportunity to discuss the introduction of electronic voting and counting at the European Parliament and local elections next June. In the short time available to me, I wish to reply to some of the points put forward by opponents of the system. I stress that the system that will be used is secure and reliable. It can be trusted by the people. It has been in use for over ten years in the Netherlands, for some years in parts of Germany, at pilots in the United Kingdom and at two polls in this country in 2002. It has recently been approved for use in France, where it will be used for the first time in Brest in March and in several locations at the European Parliament elections in June. Governments, Opposition parties and the public in such countries would not and do not operate a system which is insecure or unreliable. Their democracies are not damaged or reduced by the use of the electronic voting system. What is so peculiar to this country that a similar system cannot operate satisfactorily here?

The voting machine hardware and software that will be used have been rigorously tested on two occasions. They were tested in 2002, before the pilot use of the system, and again last year, following the modification of the voting machine to make it easier for voters to use and the addition of further security features. The German institute, PTB, stated in its report that the software accurately records the votes cast. One could not get a more definite assurance than from such an internationally accredited testing institute. Would the institute certify in writing the adequacy of the software if it was not satisfied with its structure and accuracy? Its report is available in the Oireachtas Library and on the Internet at www.electronicvoting.ie. While our current system has worked well, one does not hear alarming stories about the security of ballot papers in a ballot box and the opportunities that exist to interfere with such a box. It would be much easier to interfere with a paper ballot than to interfere with a vote recorded in a ballot module.

The system's reliability and acceptance has been proven by its record over the years in other countries and in our pilot polls — in the Dublin West, Dublin North and Meath constituencies in the 2002 general election and in seven constituencies in the Nice treaty referendum a year later. Successful use at all types of polls is the real reliability test, in my opinion.

Returning officers will apply rigid accesssecurity procedures at all stages of the election sothat only authorised staff will have access to the voting machines and the PCs to be used. Security concerns have been raised in respect of the use of PCs. These concerns have been exacerbated by the weekly news of viruses attacking computer systems. We discussed the arrangements for the PCs with experts from two leading companies in the PC and software areas, who expressedsatisfaction with our plans. New election-specific PCs will be supplied to returning officers after they have been security hardened with the software necessary for the election loaded on them. It will not be possible to load other software onto the PCs during the election period. Staff authorised by the returning officer will have access to the PC. There will be specific security access procedures to log in to the PCs, which will be under the control and direction of the returning officers at all times. The voting machines and the PCs will not be linked to a network, internally or externally. This means that hacking and virus attacks will not be possible due to the strict security protocols that will be in place.

I wish to deal with two issues raised by some opponents of the system. There has been an increasing chorus for the addition of a voter verifiable paper audit trail. I sometimes wonder if its proponents understand the system we propose. Do they accept in an uncritical manner the information provided by some individuals? The proponents of a such an audit trail come mostly from the US. Their arguments arise primarily from concerns about some voting machines used in that country. It is necessary to understand that there are many different types of voting machines, some of which are good and some not so good. The Nedap voting machine is not of the same type as the US machines in question, however. Its reliability is confirmed by its successful use in the Netherlands and in parts of Germany for many years and by international accredited testing institutes. We need some reality here. We should compare like with like. People should not accept everything that is handed to them. We should be guided by the past use of the voting machine as well as its reliability here and in other countries for many years and its testing by internationally accredited testing agencies.

Those who argue in favour of a paper audit state that the voter will see, in paper format or by means of an image on a screen, choices made on the voting machine and recorded automatically before pressing the "cast vote" button. It is argued that a paper copy should be available to check later if there is a dispute about voting machine reliability. Certain facts are relevant in that regard. The US machines are generally PC based. The Nedap voting machine, which is a proprietary product produced specifically for voting, has been used for many years in other countries without any doubts about its reliability. The machine, including software for storing votes, has been tested by the German national testing institute and certified so that it accurately stores votes as cast.

Ballot papers are visible on the screen of the Nedap machine. Voters see preference numbers beside candidates' details. Preference details are visible on the bottom line of the display screen as voters record their preferences on the machine. Details are confirmed or may be amended before the "cast vote" button is pressed. The paper trail procedure does not have any advantages in this regard. When a paper trail is in place, voters must trust that the software will record, in the storage device used, the preferences recorded after the "cast vote" button has been pressed. Under the proposed system, the control unit operator can confirm that a vote is stored and the number of votes stored can be checked on the control unit screen.

Printers can be unreliable, especially in high volume circumstances. What happens if a printer breaks down on polling day? Will voting have to be suspended? If some votes do not have a paper copy, the rechecking objective is negated. A task force which considered this matter in California, which included representatives of the electronic industry and election officials, could not reach a consensus on the use of a paper trail. The task force highlighted technical problems with the use of printers as a major obstacle. In the Irish context, printed ballot papers could raise issues about the secrecy of the ballot, as a link between voter and printed ballot paper could be established.

Ballot papers printed at the time of voting and used in a manual count later would not give the same precise result as the electronic count due to the mixing of ballot papers. This would negate one of the main reasons for a paper trail. In fairness, this was recognised in the Labour Party's report on electronic voting. In an election petition, the system can print a ballot paper for each vote cast after the mixing of the ballot, thus enabling a manual count to be conducted. I am happy to rely on the proven record of the system in other countries and the certification by international testing institutes rather than automatically reacting to some doubts raised about different types of PC-based voting machines used in the USA.

People have mentioned the possibility of making available the source code to the public. The Minister has indicated he will review this issue, taking account of the security of the system and secrecy of the ballot. It should be noted that very few countries make election source code publicly available because of security concerns.

Another area in which mischief was deliberately spread last week related to the matter of the so-called right to spoil one's vote. It has never been a purpose of electoral law or administrative arrangements to provide a facility for people to spoil their votes. The primary and essential function of an electoral system is to allow people to choose their public representatives. The electronic voting system is rightly designed to facilitate this rather than to collect and register protest votes. However, the legislation took particular care to protect the privacy of a person choosing not to press the "cast vote" button. Detailed practical guidance on these provisions will be included in the general guidelines that will be issued by the Department in connection with the June 2004 elections. If people are disaffected by the political system, while one would not advocate abstention, they are free not to vote. Alternatively, a person may attend at a polling station, be marked off the register of electors, approach the voting machine and leave without pressing the "cast vote" button. In this case the machine will be deactivated and it will record the occurrence for inclusion in the election statistics. It is not necessary to communicate with the polling station staff in this regard; one must simply walk away from the voting machine.

This country has adopted a cautious and sensible approach to electronic voting. The proposal to introduce the system has been in the public domain since 1998. We can hardly be accused of rushing after six years. We have successfully piloted the system at real polls. It is now time to move on, having secured a trustworthy system and validated and verified its ability to store and count votes securely. In introducing it in Ireland, the approach was to use an electronic voting system of proven and robust performance. This is what we have done and we have procured a system that comes with its own proprietary hardware and software and has enjoyed the proven advantage of wide-scale and successful use in other democracies. This successful operation in practice, in some of the most sophisticated societies in the world, is the most worthwhile possible test of reliability. The public has rightly always had confidence in the people who administer our elections and it is important to remember that these people will continue to administer our elections. This time they will have the benefit of a system which will eliminate human error in voting and counting to assist them. It is a system which will, more closely than any before, ensure that the results it declares reflect the exact intent of the voters.

The education and awareness campaign the Minister launched last week will employ a range of measures including TV, radio, Internet and poster advertising, countrywide roadshows and direct mail. Each element of the campaign has been developed in light of the experience of the 138,000 voters who used the system at the general election and the 270,000 who used it at the referendum in 2002. Its purpose is to inform voters about the system and how to use it and to provide opportunities for members of the public to acquaint themselves with it before polling day. It includes the largest series of information demonstrations ever undertaken by the Department, with a total of 120 full-day roadshow demonstrations of the new voting machine taking place. This will touch on every part of the country. Briefing sessions will be held with local media and candidates. Information materials will be available to anybody interested, ranging from answers to basic questions to details of technical features. The campaign will also have another significant element beyond making people familiar with the new system. It will include a module to encourage people to vote, a measure which I hope we can all support.

The move to electronic voting and counting is progressive and responsible. We are using well tested equipment and software which has been subject to rigorous independent examination. I hope the Opposition Members will, while retaining their reservations about the new system, join with the Government in implementing and supporting it for the benefit of the voter rather than creating doubts among members of the public.