If I accepted Senator Terry's amendment there would be a statutory obligation on the Minister to take these representations into account. In these circumstances, the Minister might be unable to grant a prisoner temporary release, even though other factors indicated that temporary release should be allowed for rehabilitative or other purposes. Where the concerns of the victim, or his or her family, is made known to the Minister, to the prison service or to the interim parole board, appropriate conditions may be imposed on the granting of temporary release if such temporary release is considered appropriate. The difficulty of the Minister concerns what representation the victim can make in this context. As was hinted at in Senator Terry's amendment, the victim can only seek to veto the temporary release. A victim might write to the Minister and urge him or her to allow the person to be released, but that is a more unlikely circumstance. The more likely circumstance is that the victim would write to the Minister, or the next-of-kin, as Senator Terry has carefully formulated, objecting to the release and outlining the hurt, pain and trauma it would cause to the victim. Of course, the original sentence of the court seeks to address this in the first instance. We must administer the system of temporary release because we must operate the penal system in a humane manner. While such representations are made, and the Minister attempts, having decided whether to grant temporary release, to decide whether these particular representations can be accommodated in the form of conditions, nevertheless there is a fundamental difference between that procedure and elevating it to a statutory formula that requires the Minister in all cases to have regard to that factor. The practicality is, however, that were this to be legislated for, the Minister would find himself in a position whereby his exercise of ministerial powers would eventually be called into question in the courts.