Results 61-80 of 174 for nama speaker:Eoghan Murphy

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Thank you. You also write about, in your opening statement, about Professor Schoenmaker and the successes of NAMA. And you wrote about the relative freedom that the agency had to manage the assets. But, what about the lack of flexibility regarding the bond repayment schedules that were entered into on behalf of NAMA? Did this result in a rush to sell prime assets to meet these early...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: ...to restructure the repayment schedule, given what we now know in terms of the rising value of assets? You know, because we talk about the initial costs of the bailout and then the potential for NAMA to reduce some of that cost direct through its work-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay, and then just the understanding in the Department as to the purpose of NAMA when it came to the actual developers, the people who had the loans, and what they were pursuing, because I'm just wondering did the targets change or was NAMA always meant to only be pursuing for the costs that they paid, or were they meant to be pursuing for the full costs the banks paid when it came to the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (9 Sep 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Thanks, Chair. Mr. Browne, looking then ... continuing on this theme, and enforcement of security, NAMA reported that a downward adjustment of €477 million in aggregate was required to the value of the loans acquired from the participating institutions due to the difficulties with enforcement of security, and Anglo accounted for 57% of this total, €273 million. So can you...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (8 Jul 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Just in relation to mistakes that were made in managing the crisis, and you said in paragraph 160 of your opening statement: "The slow process in transferring loans to NAMA in tranches played a role in undermining confidence in the banking system and the sovereign in general." So can we imply from that that there was a design fault within NAMA that led to the bailout?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Thank you. And my last question in relation to NAMA, because in your story of 2010, NAMA comes up quite a bit. The, you know, announcements of the haircuts in March, then again in September. And each time you mentioned them, the prospect of a bailout comes closer into view. So was the work of NAMA delayed, and if NAMA had moved more quickly, are we then talking about bailout negotiations...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (25 Jun 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Was work delayed? Was there a delay with NAMA moving through in its work?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Cardiff, you're very welcome back. The committee has gone over NAMA in a lot of detail already but there are still certain elements that we want to look into. And one thing I'd like to ask you about is, the first tranche of loan valuations by NAMA was completed in March 2010 and Governor Honohan has written that "it was clear then, extrapolating from...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Perhaps the Governor looking at what was happening with NAMA and speaking to the IMF was looking forward to September and what would happen in terms of a banking problem becoming a sovereign problem but Governor Honohan has written that he was quickly put in his place by Merrion Street officials when he conveyed this request or the suggestion from the IMF person in Ireland. Do you recall any...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (24 Jun 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: The question about ... and there's a view that ... the guarantee happens in September '08, Anglo gets nationalised at the beginning of '09 and NAMA gets to work, and then two years later you have this great movement as part of the bailout to finally bring a solution to the banking problem in Ireland. And you provided a memo to us written on 15 October 2008 in which you write to the NTMA, the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: And that involved then being involved in terms of their work in relation to NAMA that they were doing at the time?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: In the second part of that paragraph it says that, "Staff noted that losses are likely to extend beyond the property-development sector as the economy weakens and the design of NAMA should incorporate that possibility." Were the IMF saying that NAMA should deal with more than just property-related loans?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay, because in paragraph 24 of the same report it says that the authority saw merit in the IMF's staff suggestion "that NAMA-implementing legislation should encompass a broader ranger of loan types". So, you're in agreement with NAMA's view?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: But was the thinking at the time that NAMA might have a broader scope than just property-related loans going onto its books?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay, and then do you recall why the IMF staff queried why NAMA was acquiring good loans as well as bad ones?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Okay. In paragraph 25 of that same report it states that, "Staff noted that nationalization could become necessary, which would be seen as complementary to NAMA." So, at that point, when this was published in June 2009, were your offices preparing for the nationalisation of any further banks in the Irish banking system?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (10 Jun 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: "Staff noted that nationalization could become necessary but should be seen as complementary to NAMA."

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: ...got back from the Bank of Ireland actually, looking at the period 2004 to 2008. The average exception rate for buy-to-let mortgages was 17%, almost one in five. And when we look at what went to NAMA from Bank of Ireland, 191 connections were transferred, and policy exceptions were identified in 73% of those connections. Mr Burrows, would you regard those exception rates as high?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (14 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Yes. So there isn't a correlation the between, say 73% of those connections in terms of what was transferred to NAMA and the write-down in NAMA loans?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)

Eoghan Murphy: Thank you. My time is limited so I've got to move on to another area. Mr. Parlon, just in relation to NAMA, if I may, you stated in your opening statement that banking was not a feature of the CIF's activities pre-2008, and you commissioned a report then from the ... Lombard Street Research which was critical of NAMA, and this is in core document, page 7. Where did the funding for this...