Results 161-180 of 454 for nama speaker:Pearse Doherty

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)

Pearse Doherty: So can you give the committee an example, because obviously we know that NAMA took on board the loans of commercial property into NAMA and you have made very strong submissions and strong critique of NAMA in the past. Yet, they weren't houses that people owned mortgages from in rural Ireland or indeed in the capital city, they were commercial property in the most, in the main. So when you...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. The banks valued loans on an amortised basis as they were the originators of the loans. By contrast, NAMA, on acquisition of the loans, value them on fair and true-market-value basis. As a result, the aggregate loans came to be valued at €31.8 billion by NAMA in contrast to €74 billion value estimated by the banks. Against this background, how robust in your view were...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (13 May 2015)

Pearse Doherty: ...they ... in the robustness of the valuations that took place that amounted to the fact that the banks ... the institutions had loans of €74 billion that were written down as you said in 2009 by NAMA to the value of €31.8 billion?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Pearse Doherty: If I can ask you just relation to Mr. Daly from ... from NAMA, who presented evidence to the committee. He gave an assessment and I'll quote you from ... from his evidence. It said: ''Few, if any, financial institutions wanted to be left out of what was seen as a profitable business due to the larger lender margins and the relatively low operating costs''. He went on to say: "In the Irish...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (7 May 2015)

Pearse Doherty: ...what that actually entails in terms of hotels, offices and so on. We've had evidence to the committee that the commercial property sector in Ireland was very small. We also have evidence from NAMA, for example, that 29 borrowers that went into NAMA - which was commercial property - had €34 billion of par debt. In relation to stress testing within your banks ... was stress...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay, I appreciate that. My final question, Mr. Boucher, in relation to Bank of Ireland and your entry to NAMA, the board considered a paper in relation to a proposed application for Bank of Ireland to become a participant institution of NAMA. In that paper I've seen, my apologies it is not in the book of evidence, but if you can recall it, it will be helpful.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Pearse Doherty: It mentions that if the bank is unable to participate in NAMA the bank may ultimately face nationalisation. How ... was this, was this a major concern, a minor concern for the bank that if you didn't go into NAMA that you could be nationalised? And maybe if you could tell us about that-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (6 May 2015)

Pearse Doherty: So NAMA, in your view, and correct me if I'm wrong, saved you from being nationalised?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: ...to the Irish people for the mistakes that were made in your bank. As the previous speaker had indicated, you're probably best positioned, as somebody who came after the bailout, after the transfer to NAMA, but has an overview of what was going on within the bank. In your view, what was the key areas that led to the bank costing the Irish taxpayer over €20 billion?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Thanks Mr. Duffy, we know from... again evidence that has been provided to the committee in relation to the transfers from AIB and other institutions to NAMA, that the vast majority of the sum total of that money came from a small number of borrowers. And AIB is no different in this regard, did you see any issue with the group large exposure policy as contributing to the loss that AIB...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. I am not sure if you have followed the proceedings so far, we have had contributors from NAMA in, which talked about, and there has been quite a bit of discussion at the committee in relation to loan-to-value ratios and what were the real loan-to-value rations that were being offered. The suggestion has been made in many cases that the loan to value were 100%. I want to put to you...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay, in relation to NAMA and I know you mentioned NAMA bonds on page 7 of your statement in paragraph 3, and I am also aware that you weren't at AIB at the time of the transfer of the loans to NAMA, but you were there while AIB held the NAMA bonds. Can you tell the committee for what purpose did AIB use the NAMA bonds? How did they work? What were the steps involved?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (29 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: How important for your bank was it that the NAMA bonds became available to AIB to access that liquidity?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay, I appreciate that. And it is important just to try to patch together, you know, the events of the night. Can I just return in relation to NAMA. Mr. Daly, you mentioned that there was an explosion of credit and a huge amount of credit into the Irish economy. In relation to the €74 billion worth of loans that were transferred to NAMA, how much of them were in the Irish State?...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: So, half of ... just over half of all the NAMA loans and Mr. McDonagh you talked about that this cost about €40 billion in terms of the recapitalisation of the banks. Just over half of it were actually in the Irish State?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. In relation to the security that underpinned some of these loans, and you mentioned in Vol. 2, page 5, table 3 and again Vol. 1, page 4, table 2, where NAMA wrote down €477 million as a result of not being able to ... inadequate security, and then claimed back €334 million from the banks for the same purposes, which totals €811 million of unenforceable securities....

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: Okay. Mr. Daly, you mentioned commercial property was basically NAMA is commercial property, the €74 billion, the majority of this is commercial property and you give a good breakdown in relation to where the institutions and the type of property that were held in Vol. 2, page 7. We have the consideration amount, the €32.4 billion that was paid and we can see very clearly...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: ...back from the previous break you just clarified a response that you gave to myself and the question I was asking you earlier on was of the €811 million that was clawed back, or wasn't paid by NAMA, as a result of security issues, you mentioned that the loan book value of that was actually €3.5 billion, is that correct?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: But these banks which have transferred their loans to NAMA had issued loans of the value of €3.5 billion that cannot be called on because of securities, that can't be-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (22 Apr 2015)

Pearse Doherty: ...staggering, the figure of €3.5 billion, for, I'm sure, for the general public there. In relation to the Vol. 1, page 35 figure, €2.5 billion ... we look at the property valuation process that NAMA used, and particularly the property uplift adjustments - this is the long-term economic value - that NAMA used and approved by the Commission, and you give us an interesting table...