Results 321-340 of 7,975 for speaker:Joe Higgins

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Walsh, just on another issue, towards the end of 2009, according to Mr. Stanley Purcell, who comes later in the afternoon, Ernst and Young began an investigation into legacy issues at INBS. I am quoting from his statement: I gave [Ernst and Young] every assistance. The investigation ultimately led to the initiation of legal proceedings against the 'old Board' for the losses of the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: And was there a settlement?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Can you tell us what the-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes, well that's what I want, is the process. I mean, Mr. Purcell says that he had to pay to the State a sum of money, which is confidential, but can you tell me the general terms of the settlement, as far as you are concerned?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Let me just say, Chairman, for a parliamentary inquiry not to be ... If four directors have to make a settlement and one director says that they paid a sum of money to the State as part of the settlement in regard to their governance of Irish Nationwide, and a parliamentary inquiry is not enabled to explore that-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay, Chair, but the point is if there is a settlement, if at least one person does say, of the four individuals concerned, that they paid a sum of money, it would indicate that there were issues there in relation to the governance during their period.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: That's the point I'm putting to Mr. Walsh.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Walsh, finally, two very brief points or questions. Thejournal.ie, in an article on Tuesday, 12 February 2013, said as follows: Con Power ... , who sat on the INBS board between 2000 and 2006, noted how there were just six people including himself on the board and meetings would normally begin with the chairman asking Fingleton [That's Mr. Michael Fingleton]: “Well Michael, what...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Yes. In the book called Fingers, in relation to Mr. Fingleton, in relation to yourself, they're speculating about your reasons for being on the board, "Whatever his reasoning, [Walsh] Mr. Walsh [that's yourself] would later tell friends that getting involved with a toxic society was his greatest regret in an otherwise distinguished career." Would you just comment on those two last...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Walsh, I've just one issue I want to put briefly to you, and it's based on the book Fingers: The Man Who Brought Down Irish Nationwide and Cost Us €5.4 Bnby Tom Lyons and Richard Curran. It says that on 22 September 2008, that you met Mr. David Doyle, the then Secretary General of the Department of Finance. Did that meeting take place?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: The managing director being Mr. Fingleton.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Did the ... is the following then accurate or not? I quote: Walsh [you, Mr. Walsh] made his strongest argument in favour of a merger with Anglo Irish. This was the plan he had already privately discussed with its chief executive, Seán FitzPatrick, a close friend for twenty years. Anglo Irish, Walsh said, already knew many of Irish Nationwide's clients and had the expertise to manage...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay, thank you, Mr. Walsh.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: First, if I can allude again to the meeting on 7 September 2008, and Mr. Boucher, in one of his statements to this investigation, stated the purpose of the meeting was to discuss potential liquidity support for Irish Nationwide. Now, leaving the Reuters issue aside, Mr. Purcell, why was there such concern in many quarters about the viability of INBS or the need for liquidity support because...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: But were there concerns before that, Mr. Purcell? Because, for example, the Department of Finance had secretly or quietly put on the stocks legislation for the nationalisation of an institution like yours.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Can I go over again the question of whether INBS was solvent in September 2008? And if I could refer to the Goldman Sachs report that was done into INBS. This is in documentation that has been many times in front of the committee but we have it up in front of us there, Mr. Purcell. And if you see that line of the total loan book, €11.7 billion, and then their mark-to-market analysis...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Were you concerned ... were you worried at that time that INBS was insolvent, or not?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Purcell.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Drury, in a presentation to the board of Anglo dated 26 September 2008 - shortly after you left the bank or not too long after - entitled "Strategic Options", David Drumm notes that the market sees Anglo as a monoline bank with concentration risk in commercial property and he proposes a merger with IL and P which would create a more diversified business model. In your opinion, did the...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (30 Jul 2015)

Joe Higgins: No, I understand that, Mr. Drury, but-----