Results 301-320 of 7,975 for speaker:Joe Higgins

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Finally, Mr. Fingleton, for time-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Right. Finally, Chairman. Mr. Fingleton, if demutualisation had happened in the course of up to 2005 or 2006, what would it have meant to the management of INBS in terms of financial gain?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Would it not have been much more than that, Mr. Fingleton? Would it not have been tied to the extent of the assets, the loans, the profits?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: So do you say then ... do you deny the suggestion that is made in a number of sources-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: -----that the drive for-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Let me just state-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: -----state what's said. That ... Nyberg makes it, among others.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Okay, I'm about to put it to you.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: That the drive for demutualisation was linked to the very high levels of lending, the drive for profits, etc. ... that that's the point that's made.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Thank you.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Walsh, if we could get on the evidence book - it will come up in front of you there - some of the growth indicators for Irish Nationwide between 1998 up to 2007. It is in front of you now. Over the period 2002 to 2007 in particular, profit before tax increased by 303%, and total assets by 190%. Even the four diagrams there will show what some people might think would be an astonishing...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: But, Mr. Walsh, can I ask you ... you said in retrospect, but may I press you in relation to your own position? I mean, you were not an untutored novice arriving at a board. You're a distinguished academic and you were professor of banking at UCD. What is your academic background, just in very brief terms?

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: For some decades in any case.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Can I suggest Mr. Walsh, or ask you why you wouldn't be aware - theoretically but also from practical experience of history - of the dangers here? For example, Professor Honohan, the former Governor of the Central Bank, in an article in the Economic and Social Review, summer 2009 says as follows, "A very simple warning sign used by most regulators to identify a bank exposed to increased risk...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: But Mr. Walsh, with respect, the society was involved in highly speculative activity. KPMG, its own auditors, referred to, you know, the speculative land developments. And, for example, you got a letter in 2003 from the regulator expressing concern on the growing concentration in property and development land. And then by September 2008, 80% of your loan book was in commercial property,...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Now should you again, above all, have realised that this was ... that no property boom goes exponentially onwards without collapsing? And by the way, there were people, as you know ... we had evidence here where in 2003, David McWilliams very accurately predicted what was going to happen. I am wondering why, as an academic, you couldn't see this.

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Walsh, the Project Harmony, which was a due diligence report that you'd be familiar with in 2007 doing the ... examining the society up to the end of 2006, found a concentration of loans in the higher risk development sector at 41% of total commercial lending. Concentration of loans in higher loan-to-value, 30% of commercial loans had higher than 100% loan-to-value and 30 commercial...

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Except that you should have known that, by the laws of finance, capital and the way capitalism works, that what goes up comes down, but I think we've explored that somewhat. Can I ask you, moving forward-----

Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis: Nexus Phase (2 Sep 2015)

Joe Higgins: Mr. Walsh, just on the subject of demutualisation, and that was one of the key reasons why you were brought onto the board, and Nyberg says that the drive to demutualisation was a very important factor in the years that you were there. In your opinion, did the desire of management to maximise the value of Irish Nationwide for demutualisation result in the adoption of poor lending practices...